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This study investigates how Ukraine’s geographical patterns of democratic political culture are 
shaped by historical legacies from long defunct empires and states. The thesis’ focus is on what 
has been called a “natural experiment”, whereby the lands of present-day Ukraine were divided, 
first between the Habsburg Empire and the Russian Empire (1772-1917), and later between 
Poland and the Soviet Union (1921-1939). The aim is to find out if the empires and states which 
ruled over Ukraine in these time periods have left legacies that can explain Ukraine’s regional 
variations in democratic political culture.  
 
The thesis employs theory about how political culture is shaped by societal developments, and 
how national identity can be a carrier of political values across time. Arguments for why it may 
be thought that the foreign powers that ruled over Ukraine caused the emergence of distinct 
democratic political cultures are thoroughly investigated, and a set of expectations are developed. 
Since historical borders from different time periods nearly overlap, a high level of geographical 
precision is needed when testing for differences in support for democratic values between 
historical regions. Two surveys from Kiev International Institute of Sociology allow for a 
sufficiently high level of precision. 
 
It is found a clear threshold in level of support for democratic values along the former border 
between the Habsburg Empire and the Russian Empire, but no such threshold is found along the 
former border between Poland and the Soviet Union. It can thus be inferred that a legacy of the 
Habsburg Empire is a higher level of democratic political culture than that of the Russian 
Empire, and that a particularly strong support for democratic values in Western Ukraine can be 
explained by imperial legacies. The thesis contributes with a more precise analysis than what is 
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1.1 Topic and research question 
Ever since open political competition became possible with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
Ukraine has been characterized by strong regional divisions, which in many cases have 
concurred with historical divisions between former empires and states. In popular debate and 
media reports there have often been talks about the spread of “democratic” and “authoritarian” 
values in “western” and “eastern” Ukraine respectively. While this dichotomy has been rightfully 
criticized as an over-simplification of the real situation (Riabchuk 2009, Katchanovski 2018), 
there are clear signs that different views on the desirability of liberal democracy is an aspect of 
what makes up Ukraine’s regional divisions. Election results have shown clear geographical 
patterns, and parties and candidates most strongly backing democratic reform have consistently 
received most support in western parts of the country (Kuzio 2015).  
 
That the population of a country is supportive of democratic values, is seen as necessary for 
democracy to take root (Eckstein 1998a; Fuchs & Roller 1994). In the Ukrainian case the 
democratization process has been problematic, and it has proved very difficult to reach a 
consensus in society on key issues related to regime type, nation building and foreign policy 
orientation. This has been very evident the last few years, evidenced by the 2014 revolution and 
the subsequent outbreak of war in eastern Ukraine. Polls show that while the protests leading up 
to the 2014 revolution were supported by more than 90 % of the population in the westernmost 
part of Ukraine, less than 25 % in the easternmost part supported the protests (IRI1 2014, 101). 
The root causes behind Ukraine’s current divisions have often been attributed to certain 
historical events and developments that have created long-lasting regional differences in political 
values, identities and attitudes. Through an analysis of two nationwide surveys this thesis 
investigates these claims. 
 
                                               







Claims about differences between West and East are backed by scholars who point to historical 
legacies as an explanation for a lower level of commitment to democratic values in the 
easternmost part of the former communist Eastern Europe. For a period beginning in the late 
18th century and ending with World War 1, Eastern and Central Europe was divided between 
empires which had very different approaches to how to rule over their peoples and territories. 
And for the following period of around 20 years between World War 1 and World War 2, a new 
division ran through Eastern Europe between the areas that became part of the Soviet Union 
from its early establishment on the eastern side, and the areas that escaped communism until 
World War 2 on the western side. It has been suggested that the root causes of the lower level of 
commitment to democratic values in the easternmost part of Eastern Europe can be traced back 
to these territorial-political divisions (Fuchs & Klingemann 2006; Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017).  
 
Both the imperial border between the Habsburg Empire and the Russian Empire (1772-1917), 
and the state border between Poland and the Soviet Union (1921-1939), ran right through areas 
that today belong to Ukraine. This is why Peisakhin (2015, 25-26) calls Ukraine a “natural 
experiment” that invites for investigation of how imperial legacies affect today’s political 
culture, and Pop-Eleches & Tucker (2017, 24-25) suggest Ukraine as a case for future research 
on how the length of time that an area has been subject to communism affects people’s 
commitment to democratic values. In this thesis we will follow both of these suggestions and 
investigate whether historical legacies can explain regional differences in peoples’ commitment 
to democratic values in Ukraine. Our research question thus becomes: 
 
“Can geographical patterns of democratic political culture in Ukraine be explained by the 
historical legacies of former empires and states?” 
 
Findings of stronger support for democratic values in western Ukraine have been explained by 
pointing to historical legacies (Person 2010, ICDT2 2015), but due to Ukraine’s complex history 
and shifting borders it has not been completely clear which historical processes may have caused 
the emergence of these regional differences. Historical borders have been near overlapping, and 
Miller, White and Heywood (1998, 10) therefore went as far as saying that if any distinct values 
                                               







were found in western Ukraine there would be “no way of knowing” which historical periods or 
regimes had caused their emergence. Our choice of surveys, however, and the development of 
our research design, is made so that we can as precise as possible make assessments about the 
geographical differences in support for democratic values among the population of Ukraine. This 
will enable us to say more about when, and therefore also why, these differences emerged. Our 
main geographical focus will be on the area around the historical borders, which crossed through 
the territories that today are situated in the western part of Ukraine. 
1.2 Structure of thesis 
Chapter 2 presents a map of Ukraine with place names, and can be used for reference throughout 
this thesis. Chapter 3 conceptualizes “democratic values” and “democratic political culture” and 
looks at the most relevant factors that are thought to play a role in the shaping of a society’s 
democratic political culture. We will then turn to the concept of “historical legacies” and explain 
how we can understand that term. Throughout the second chapter we will comment on findings 
which are relevant for our investigation, and we will place the Ukrainian case in the wider 
Eastern European context. Chapter 4 focuses on Ukraine and will present the arguments for why 
we may expect that certain geographical patterns of democratic culture in Ukraine can be 
explained by historical legacies. Our perspective will be comparative, as we will discuss how 
developments on different sides of historical borders may have caused the emergence of different 
levels of democratic political culture. We will here also consider the role of economy, 
demography, religion, ethnicity and language in the makeup of Ukraine’s democratic political 
culture, and present relevant findings in the literature. Chapter 4 will then continue with the 
development of a conceptual map of Ukraine which summarizes the main factors behind the 
country’s geographical pattern of democratic political culture and conclude with the formulation 
of three hypotheses. Chapter 5 presents our data and method. We will discuss the surveys we 
have chosen for our investigation, and we will see how questions about democratic values in 
these surveys concur with our concept. This chapter will include a section which explains why 
we create a composite measure of support for democratic values. We will further explain why 
and how we will conduct the hypothesis testing by use of OLS-regression with regional dummy 







7 discusses the results in light of the literature that have been considered. We will here discuss 
the implications of our results and how we are contributing to the literature. Chapter 8 will 
conclude and present suggestions for future research. 
 
 
2. Map of Ukraine and note on the spelling of place names 
Figure 2.1 Territorial administrative structure of Ukraine3 
 
Number of geographical 
unit 
Name of geographical unit Number of geographical 
unit (cont.) 
Name of geographical 
unit (cont.) 
1 Zakarpattia 14 Sumy 
2 Chernivtsi 15 Poltava 
3 Lviv 16 Cherkasy 
4 Ivano-Frankivsk 17 Kirovohrad 
5 Ternopil 18 Odesa 
6 Volyn 19 Mykolaiv 
7 Rivne 20 Kherson 
8 Khmelnytsk 21 Zaporizhzhia 
9 Zhytomyr 22 Dnipropetrovsk 
10 Vinnytsia 23 Kharkiv 
11 Kiev oblast 24 Luhansk 
12 City of Kiev 25 Donetsk 
13 Chernihiv 26 Crimea 
 
Source: Kuzio (1998, xiv). 
 
                                               







Figure 2.1 shows the present-day territorial-administrative structure of Ukraine. When we later 
refer to individual oblasts this map can be used as reference. When maps which are used in 
future chapters include numbers for individual oblasts, these numbers will correspond with the 
numbers on Figure 2.1. 
 
The geographical units shown on this map do not have the same administrative status, but for the 
sake of simplicity we will throughout this thesis refer to the administrative units as oblasts.4 
Normally we will drop the word “oblast” and just refer to individual oblasts by their name.5 The 
spelling of Ukrainian place names in English differ widely in the literature. We will, with one 
exception, in this thesis be spelling the names of Ukrainian administrative units in English as it is 
done by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2010). The exception is Kyiv, where we will use the 


















                                               
4 Ukraine consists of 27 territorial administrative units, including 24 oblasts, two cities of republican subordination 
(Kyiv and Sevastopol), as well as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 2010). The 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and City of Sevastopol will be referred to colloquially as Crimea. We will thus 
consider only 26 territorial units of Ukraine.  
5 The administrative status of Kiev oblast and the City of Kiev will normally be included when we refer to these 








3.1 Democratic values and political culture 
When we in this thesis talk about commitment to “democratic values” we will mean support for 
the “basic principles of liberal democratic government”, as is done by Fuchs & Roller (1994) and 
Norris (1999, 10-11, 16-17). The “basic principles of liberal democratic government” will here 
refer to Dahl’s (1971, 3; 1989, 233) concept of democracy.6 Our study of people’s commitment 
to democratic values in Ukraine can be placed inside the wider paradigm of studies of political 
culture. One of the founding books of the tradition of political culture defines this concept as 
“the particular distribution of patterns of orientation towards political objects among the 
members of [a] nation” (Almond & Verba [1963] 1965, 13). Political culture is thus defined as a 
macro-level phenomenon whose component parts are individuals’ value orientations. What we 
will be investigating in this thesis is how historical legacies affect the particular distribution of 
commitment to democratic values among the population of Ukraine. 
 
The study of political culture has a long history and has been of interest to scholars especially 
due to its theorized connection with the endurance of political regimes. In Democracy in 
America Tocqueville ([1835] 2012) describes how the American population have certain habits 
and ways of thinking that are supportive of democracy. From the 1960s the topic of political 
culture caught the interest of political scientists, and authors like Eckstein (1961) and Almond & 
Verba ([1963] 1965) became interested in how certain cultural conditions must be in place for 
any political regime to be stable in the long term. Eckstein’s (1961, 1998b) view is that a 
political regime is stable if the patterns of authority found in society are congruent with the 
patterns of authority found at the state level, and Almond & Verba in The Civic Culture (1963), 
explain how a certain type political culture, the civic culture, is best suited for sustaining 
democracy.7 We will in this thesis, however, not try to explore every facet about Ukraine’s 
                                               
6 The basic principles of Dahl’s concept of democracy can be summarized, as is done by Fuchs & Roller (1994, 15), 
as freedom of expression, associational autonomy, alternative information, inclusive suffrage, free and fair elections, 
elected officials, and the right to run for office. 
7 Citizens in a civic culture are aware of their potential to influence politics but are not permanently politically 
mobilized. However, when an issue becomes salient in society they do mobilize politically, and this behavior of 







political culture or the exact relationship between the country’s political culture and regime 
stability. Our focus will be on how historical legacies are shaping commitment to democratic 
values, and we will in the following subchapters look into the literature on the long-term 
development and stability of this facet of political culture. 
 
Two different approaches to the study of democratic values are 1) a broad approach that takes 
into account whole systems of value orientations that are collectively seen as supportive of 
democracy, and 2) an approach that focuses more exclusively on people’s support for a 
democratic political system and their commitment to values that are seen as founding blocks of 
this system.8 We will in this thesis employ the second of these approaches. The reasons for this 
are both theoretical and pragmatic. As we will see, historical legacies in Ukraine are theorized to 
have an impact precisely on people’s commitment to basic democratic values, while how these 
legacies are affecting extended systems of value orientations has not been much looked into. We 
have also been facing a choice regarding which surveys to use. As we will come back to, an 
analysis with a high level of geographical precision is what is needed in the literature, and the 
only surveys that allow for a precise geographical analysis are surveys that focus narrowly on 
basic democratic values.9 However, as findings from research done following the first approach 
are also of interest to us, we will briefly introduce that too here.  
 
A central proponent of this first approach is Inglehart (1997), who introduces a two-dimensional 
values map which shows polarization on the one dimension in terms of survival values versus 
self-expression values, and the second dimension shows traditional values versus secular-
rational values. These two dimensions are made on the basis of more specific questions about 
values and behavior, and the answer people give on a given question proves to be interrelated 
with the answers they give on other questions. Inglehart & Welzel (2005), using the World 
Values Survey, one of the world’s largest survey databases, show that there are strong 
correlations between certain questions both on an individual level and on a national aggregate 
                                               
democracy - not only as an instrument for reaching economic or other goals, but as an important end-goal in itself 
(Almond & Verba 1965 [1963], 29-30). 
8 When we talk about democratic values we could also have mentioned studies of social capital, as done by for 
example Putnam (1993, 2000). Studies of social capital focus more on people’s behavior, particularly in terms of 
participation in civil society, and a study of social capital in Ukraine is outside the scope of this thesis. 







level. There are thus empirical reasons for grouping together questions about values and behavior 
on the two above-mentioned value dimensions. One of Inglehart & Welzel’s main points is that 
self-expression values are supportive of democracy, and included in the self-expression values 
measure are specific questions about the importance of living in a democracy (2005, 56). 
According to this approach, in other words, people’s support for a democratic system per se is 
just a part of what makes up a democratic political culture. 
 
An approach where the focus is on support for a democratic political system is used by authors 
such as Eckstein (1998a), Fuchs & Klingemann (2006), Fuchs & Roller (1994) and Norris 
(1999). They base their models of political culture on Easton’s (1965) concepts of diffuse and 
specific support for the political system. By diffuse support for a democratic system is meant 
commitment to the basic values that a liberal democracy is founded on. These value 
commitments are deep and slow-changing, and the long-term stability and survival of a 
democratic system can be dependent on that there is a historically and culturally rooted support 
for democratic values in society (Eckstein 1998a, 357). At the same time, people’s specific 
support for the democratic system - which is dependent on the actual performance of the system - 
can over time feed back into diffuse support, by strengthening or eroding people’s commitment 
to basic democratic values (Eckstein 1998a, 357; Fuchs & Roller 1994). The focus of this thesis, 
however, is long-term causes that are behind the geographical pattern of diffuse support for a 
democratic political system - meaning commitment to democratic values - among the population 
of Ukraine. The degree to which the members of a society are committed to democratic values is 
what we will here refer to as society’s level of democratic political culture, or just democratic 
culture. 
3.2 Development of political cultures and mass attitudes toward 
democracy 
We will in this subchapter look closer at factors that are shaping people’s commitment to 
democratic values. One of the steps we will take is to conceptualize “historical legacies” and see 
how historical processes - especially those connected with pre-communist and communist-







do that, we will outline some basic theoretical understandings that are of relevance for us, 
namely how political cultures can persist in certain geographical areas or certain societal groups, 
and how political cultures can change over time. 
3.2.1 Factors that shape people’s commitment to democratic values 
The social and cultural context that individuals live in is seen as a major source of values and 
identities in political culture theory. Contextual effects, as explained by Huckfeldt and Sprague 
(1993), are effects on individual behavior and beliefs stemming from socialization in a specific 
milieu. The behaviors and beliefs prevailing in a certain geographical area or certain societal 
group according to this approach, affect the behaviors and beliefs of those growing up and living 
in the area or belonging to the social group in question. Huckfeldt and Sprague emphasize that an 
individual normally is affected by more than just one context, as (s)he may belong to several 
societal groups at the same time, and that the specific effect that a context has on an individual is 
dependent both on the characteristics of this individual and on the wider context. We will 
continue by looking closer at the connection between cultural groups, identity and political 
values, and then proceed with other approaches to development of democratic values. 
3.2.1.1 Cultural identities and religion 
Almond (1990, 150-151) made the case that values that are associated with ethnicity, nationality 
or religion are very resistant to change, and that this is the reason why the Soviet Union never 
managed to change the political cultures of the countries in Eastern Europe. The notion of a 
connection between cultural identities, worldviews and values is supported by Ross (2000, 42), 
who sees cultural identity as a key factor influencing people’s understanding of the world. 
Culture, as defined by Geertz’ (1973, 89) is "an historically transmitted pattern of meaning 
embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means 
of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes 
towards life". Ross sees these particular patterns of meaning and systems of conceptions as being 
transmitted inside groups consisting of individuals with a shared identity. Those sharing a 
cultural identity thus also share an understanding of social reality, and of themselves as 
belonging to a particular group with a particular history and way of life distinct from other 







political behavior a group member expects from other group members in particular situations 
depends on the group members’ shared worldview. The worldview embedded in a particular 
identity is thus shaping group members’ reasoning and political attitudes and behavior (Ross 
2000, 42-44). People with a shared identity and common meanings and view of societal order 
can be said to make up a political community, and normally people will be a part of more than 
one community at the same time so that multiple loyalties develop (2000, 43). Laitin (1988, 591) 
takes up a similar point when he holds that there normally will be more than one cultural identity 
available to people. People can thus see themselves as primarily belonging either to for example 
a religious group, an ethnic group or a linguistic group. If a person primarily identifies as a 
member of a religious group, the worldview promoted by this religious group will probably be of 
high importance to him. Likewise, a strong identification with a certain ethnic group may 
increase the importance of a worldview and historiography shared by members of this group. A 
form of cultural identity in which common myths and worldviews have a particularly large 
emphasis is national identity.10  
 
In Eastern Europe after the fall of communism, countries and areas where the population has a 
strong perception of their own national identity have been shown to vote for political parties 
supporting democratization. In the former Soviet Union this has been the case in the Baltic states 
and in Western Ukraine (Kuzio 2001, Way 2010, Darden & Grzymala-Busse 2006). Where 
perceptions of a national identity have been weaker, as in Belarus and Eastern Ukraine, 
democratization has been less successful, and votes for pro-democratic parties have been fewer 
(Eke & Kuzio 2000, Way 2010, Darden & Grzymala-Busse 2006). Shulman (2005, 59), who 
strongly emphasizes the role of national identity in a country’s political culture, explains this by 
pointing to how the members of a national group associate certain values and developmental 
models, like democracy or communism, with their own or other national groups. Those who see 
themselves as having a history of experience with democracy and see themselves as historically 
associated with other democratic nations, will be more supportive of democracy. This support 
will be strengthened if the main “Other” of their national group is perceived as non-democratic. 
Seeing one’s own national group as historically associated with Europe and opposed to Russia 
                                               









will therefore strengthen the commitment to democratic values among the members of this 
national group (Shulman 2005, 65-69).  
 
Another factor that has received attention in the study of political culture in Eastern Europe is 
that of religion. In many cases the Catholic Church was a source of opposition against 
Communist rule, and Catholicism and national identity could be mutually supportive as in the 
cases of Poland and Lithuania (Grzymala-Busse 2014). Wittenberg (2006) shows how anti-
communist attitudes in Hungary was supported by both the Catholic and Calvinist churches, and 
Pop-Eleches & Tucker (2017) find that Catholics in former communist countries in general are 
more committed to democratic values than adherents to other denominations and religions. Their 
explanation is that the message of resistance against communism that emanated from the Church, 
and the external support from the Pope, made Catholics less susceptible to indoctrination of 
communist values. We will soon come back to the legacies of communist and pre-communist 
regimes, but before that we will look closer at other factors that shape people’s commitment to 
democratic values. 
3.2.1.2 Cultural modernization 
An important strand of the literature is the one that stresses economic development as a driver for 
development of democratic values in a population. This view is rooted in the tradition of 
modernization theory, originally associated with Lerner (1958) and Lipset (1959), and sees 
economic modernization as a driving force for democratization. Inglehart (1990) and Inglehart & 
Welzel (2005) see a high level of life security (normally equaling a high income), a high level of 
education, and room for creativity and autonomy at the workplace as factors that increase an 
individual’s drive for self-expression. These processes take place on an individual level, but one 
of Inglehart & Welzel’s points is that also the context of living in an economically highly 
developed society has an effect on an individual’s value orientations. In a communist 
dictatorship, however, the effect of for example higher education is not necessarily a higher level 
of democratic values. Pop-Eleches (2014) holds that the lack of commitment to democratic 
values among the population of post-Communist countries is the main reason why these 
countries in general - and the countries which were a part of the Soviet Union from its beginning 
in particular - are less democratic than other countries at a comparable level of development. He 







high reliance on technical sciences, meant that the highly educated middle class in communist 
countries did not acquire the same level of commitment to democratic values as the highly 
educated middle class in non-communist countries (2014, 41-44). He further suggests (2014, 45), 
on the line of Jowitt (1992), that as the urban population has been most subjected to communist 
indoctrination efforts, the higher standard of living in communist cities should not necessarily be 
enough for the urban population to acquire a higher level of democratic values than their rural 
counterparts. This suggestion, which is in contradiction with much of the general literature on 
political culture, is supported by findings of Pop-Eleches & Tucker (2017), who find that overall 
in former communist countries, urban residence leads to lower support for democratic values. 
3.2.1.3 Experiences with democracy 
We have already in Chapter 3.1 touched upon specific support and feedback effects from 
evaluations of the performance of democracy on people’s commitment to democratic values. In 
this respect, Fuchs & Roller (1994, 36-38) see as most important how citizens evaluate the 
actions of decision-making politicians, the functioning of the institutional mechanisms of the 
democratic system, as well as their evaluations of the economic situation. As we are doing a case 
study of a single country with a unitary governmental system, the whole population must 
necessarily be subject to the same decision-making politicians and governmental institutions. We 
are interested in factors that are shaping Ukraine’s regional differences in democratic culture, 
and chances are greater that there are regional differences in citizens’ evaluation of the economic 
situation, as there might be great spatial variation in terms of the economic situation. Others who 
have stressed citizens’ evaluations of the economic situation in post-communist countries are 
Przeworski (1991) and Kitschelt (1992), who argued that the economic winners of the transition 
would support democracy, while the economic losers would favor a restoration of communism. 
 
In every cross-regional or cross-national investigation of political culture it is implicitly 
assumed, if not explicitly said, that political culture is in one way or another a product of 
historical processes. If not, distinct regional or national political cultures would never appear. 
What makes political culture change, and how fast these changes appear, has been a central 
question in the political culture literature, and also a point of dispute. Almond & Verba ([1963] 







developing processes, but Verba (1989, 399-401) concluded that what they had originally seen as 
very stable patterns could change fast under the right circumstances. Putnam (1993) traced the 
regional differences in political culture in Italy centuries back in time but has been criticized for 
overlooking more immediate causes for these divisions (Tarrow 1996). Huntington (1996) 
proposed that the world is divided into a number of cultural zones that largely correspond to 
areas of the world which traditionally have had the same majority religion. Inglehart & Welzel 
(2005) find strong evidence that there are indeed large and persisting differences in political 
culture between these cultural zones, but at the same time they show that societies’ political 
culture can change fast in periods of socioeconomic development. An analogy used by Larry 
Diamond (1993, 412) is that political culture must be understood as a “geological structure”, 
where different historical ages and events have all left “sedimentary deposits” of values and 
beliefs. Our task will be to try to single out which historical periods that have given rise to 
regional differences in political culture in Ukraine. We will now turn to the long-term 
developments of political culture and introduce a framework of historical legacies. 
3.2.2 Historical legacies 
Despite much literature on “historical legacies”, a common understanding of the concept of 
legacies has been missing in the post-communist context. Within this context, legacies have been 
conceptualized either as 1) causal factors influencing post-communist outcomes (Kitschelt 2003, 
Pop-Eleches 2007), or as 2) effects, in the form of beliefs and practices, of causal factors which 
operated in an earlier time period (Beissinger & Kotkin 2014, 7; Wittenberg 2015). The first of 
these approaches is used for example when the focus of a study is on how the structural, cultural 
and institutional starting points of ex-communist countries are shaping post-communist regime 
trajectories (Pop-Eleches 2007, 910), and will not be used by us here. We will follow the second 
approach, as our focus will be on causal relationships between processes that started in the pre-
communist era and political-cultural outcomes today.  
 
We will use Beissinger & Kotkin’s (2014, 7) definition of a historical legacy, wich is “a durable 
causal relationship between past institutions and policies on subsequent practices or beliefs, long 
beyond the life of the regimes, institutions, and policies that gave birth to them”. Their focus is 







practices and beliefs through causal relationships and mechanisms. This is different from 
Wittenberg’s (2015) approach to historical legacies, which is more focused on the persistence of 
phenomena across time, and less on the causal relationships and mechanism linking historical 
causes with present-day phenomena. Beissinger & Kotkin (2014, 12) argue that a focus on the 
sameness of a phenomenon across time means underplaying what they see as the most central 
point, namely how the origin of the present-day phenomenon can be found in certain formative 
historical experiences. “Legacies”, as seen by Beissinger & Kotkin (2014, 11), can be beliefs and 
practices that develop in ways so that the new beliefs and practices only vaguely resemble what 
they once were. 
 
Beissinger & Kotkin see it as relevant to talk about legacies only where a societal rupture has put 
an end to an old order. Laporte & Lussier (2011) agree and suggest that a phenomenon is only 
interesting as a legacy if it has survived a critical juncture11 that destroyed the conditions that 
gave rise to it. This concept, as well as the concept of path dependency, are central in the 
theoretical framework of historical institutionalism,12 but are tools that Pierson (2004, 10) sees as 
useful for everyone who studies the temporal dimensions of social processes. Hacker (2002, 54), 
quoted by Pierson (2004, 21), sees path dependence as “developmental trajectories that are 
inherently difficult to reverse”. According to Pierson (2004, 21), path dependence is generated 
by developmental trajectories that are giving positive feedback, meaning that they are self-
reinforcing. This process can be seen when, for example, an emerging worldview or ideology 
reaches a critical mass and generates culture-producing institutions, organizations and actors that 
contribute in spreading and reinforcing this worldview or ideology (Pierson 2004, 39). Another 
aspect that Pierson stresses is how the temporal ordering of events and processes can be a key to 
understanding how certain paths of development are followed and how certain social phenomena 
emerge. The impact of a historical event or process on long-term outcomes cannot be predicted if 
                                               
11 A critical juncture marks a period of significant change that is supposed to produce enduring legacies, whereby 
different countries (or other units of analysis) are sent on diverging trajectories (Collier & Collier 1991, 29; 
Mahoney 2001, 6-8). 
12 Historical institutionalism is an approach to the study of social change where the focus is on how institutions 
structure and shape outcomes, often in a long-term perspective (Steinmo 2008). Even though this term itself dates 
back only to 1989 (2008, 136-137), some of the classics of comparative politics, like Moore (1966) and Skocpol 
(1979) are often associated with historical institutionalism. This approach is closely related to the legacy approach, 
but while the historical institutionalist approach sees a legacy as a trajectory which is followed as a consequence of 
choices taken during critical junctures, the legacy approach sees a legacy as a factor that survives a critical juncture. 







the timing of this event or process relative to other events and processes is not taken into 
consideration. As the long-lasting causes of initial events and processes have implications for the 
outcomes of later events or processes, an event or a process may in one case occur too early or 
too late to produce the same outcome that it did in another case (2004, 67-71). These tools and 
insights offered by Pierson will be a part of our analytical arsenal when we shall discuss findings 
of historical legacies in Ukraine. 
 
Beissinger & Kotkin (2014, 12) differentiate between five types of historical legacies - 
fragmentation13, translation14, bricolage15, parameter setting16 and cultural schemata. What they 
mean by “cultural schemata” is “embedded ways of thinking and behaving that originate from 
socialization experiences under the prior political order but persist long beyond the macro 
political rupture” (2014, 15). Our study of regional differences of political culture in Ukraine will 
be a study of the persistence of such “embedded ways of thinking”. We will explain thoroughly 
what has caused the emergence of these regional differences, and how they may have survived. 
 
By combining the political culture and historical legacies paradigms, we have developed a 
framework which will prove to be fruitful for analyzing how regional differences in political 
culture have emerged and persisted in Ukraine. 
3.2.3 Historical legacies and political culture in Eastern Europe 
Since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe much research has been done on historical 
legacies in this region. As pointed out by Pop-Eleches (2015), two different approaches to the 
study of historical legacies in the post-communist world is 1) the approach that is rooted in 
Jowitt (1992), which focuses on the long-term effects of Communist rule, and 2) the approach 
that is rooted in Janos (1993), which focuses on the long-term effects of regimes, institutions and 
                                               
13 When ““new” units are created out of an institutional rupture that are merely fragments or remnants of old 
institutions, and therefore closely resemble the parent unit” (Beissinger & Kotkin 2014, 12). 
14 When “an old practice finds new purpose and is redeployed in a different way than was true at the time in which 
the practice originated” (Beissinger & Kotkin 2014, 13). 
15 When “elements of the past become thoroughly intermixed and interpenetrated with the present, creating 
something completely new that only vaguely resembles the old, but that still profoundly 
bears its imprint” (Beissinger & Kotkin 2014, 14). 
16 “places limits on how individuals think and behave, so that the legacy relationship involves the existence of limits 







policies that existed before the onset of communism. The first of these approaches is primarily 
concerned with the homogenizing long-term impact of the communist mode of modernization. 
One then seeks to investigate the effects caused by totalitarian rule, ideological indoctrination, 
repression and heavy industrialization on later cultural and political developments. The second 
approach is primarily concerned with how societies that had been socially, culturally, politically 
and economically unequal before the onset of communism, but that had all been subjected to 
decades of communist rule, emerged from communism as still unequal societies and have had 
diverging developmental paths since the fall of communism. 
 
Legacies of communist rule have been found to affect post-communist developments in domains 
such as post-communist regime trajectories (Bunce 1998; Linz & Stepan 1996; Pop-Eleches 
2007), civil society (Howard 2003; Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2013) and societal and political 
cleavages (Evans & Whitefield 2000; Kitschelt et al. 1999). However, Evans & Whitefield 
(2000) and Kitschelt et al. (1999) see the development of post-communist cleavages as being 
affected also by legacies from states and regimes that existed before the onset of communism. 
The same is found to be the case for post-communist regime trajectories (Bunce 2005; Pop-
Eleches 2007), trust in institutions (Badescu & Sun 2005; Becker et al. 2016) and voting patterns 
(Darden & Grzymala-Busse 2006, Wittenberg 2006). Especially in Poland the link between pre-
communist legacies, political culture, and voting patterns has been widely researched. See for 
example Janczak (2015) or Jasiewicz (2009). 
 
Communist regimes were special in that they made a formidable effort to transform people’s 
value orientations. In the Soviet Union, the goal was to create a Soviet culture, and to reach that 
goal alternative ways of thinking than the official Marxist-Leninist doctrine had to be eradicated. 
Severe suppression of opposing worldviews, a state propaganda apparatus working at schools 
and workplaces, as well as a total media monopoly was used for indoctrination of true Marxist-
Leninist values (Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017). It has been shown repeatedly that support for 
democratic values is lower in former communist countries in Eastern Europe than in Western 
Europe (Fuchs 1999; Inglehart & Welzel 2005, Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017). Similarly, the 







to have an even lower support for democratic values than other former communist countries 
(Fuchs & Klingemann 2006, Klicperova-Baker & Kostal 2018; Miller, White & Heywood 1998). 
 
Fuchs & Klingemann (2006, 34-35, 58) hold several mutually non-exclusive possibilities open 
for why people in the easternmost countries are less committed to democratic values. As they see 
it is possible that this is caused by 1) the impact of additional years of communist rule in the 
areas that were a part of the Soviet Union from it establishment in 1921, it may be caused by 2) 
the different impact of the rule of the four empires that controlled much of Eastern Europe before 
World War 1, it may be caused by 3) the impact of the traditional religion of the countries in 
question, and it may be caused by 4) the easternmost countries being at a lower level of socio-
economic development. All of these proposed lines of division are geographically close to each 
other, and as we will see, particularly the proposed causes number two and three are very closely 
connected and difficult to separate in the case of Ukraine. Due to this near-overlap of former 
borders, and since investigations of political culture in Eastern Europe are often done on the 
country-level, it is no easy task to provide evidence for any of Fuchs & Klingemann’s 
suggestions. However, that a higher number of years of communist rule in a country leaves a 
legacy of a lower level support for democratic values among the population is shown by Pop-
Eleches & Tucker (2017, 134-135) and Inglehart & Welzel (2005, 76), and that imperial rule by 
the Habsburg Empire has left a legacy of a higher level of commitment to democratic values than 
imperial rule by the Russian Empire is shown by Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya (2015), Drummond & 
Lubecki (2010) and Darden & Grzymala-Busse (2005). Inglehart & Welzel (2005) also 
investigate the impact of traditional religions on present day political culture and find that self-
expression values17 are more widespread in societies where Catholicism has been the traditional 
majority religion than in societies which have traditionally been dominated by Orthodox 
Christianity.18 
 
We have now seen how historical legacies, different contexts and identities, membership in 
social groups, and individual experiences at the same time can affect an individual’s value 
orientations. For us this means that we will have to make precise assessments of which areas 
                                               
17 See Chapter 3.1 







where we expect a historical legacy argument to be operating, and also that we should take into 
account the geographical distributions of certain ethnic, linguistic or religious groups and people 
with different levels of education and income. We will now turn to the case of Ukraine and 
explain how we will take all of these factors into consideration. 
4. Development of political culture and commitment to 
democratic values in Ukraine 
In survey-based studies of mass attitudes in Ukraine, region of residence is generally found to 
have a very strong effect as compared to effects of other demographic variables on attitudes 
toward Russia and Europe (Barrington & Faranda 2009, Katchanovski 2002; 2006, Kubicek 
2000, Munro 2007, Peisakhin 2015), toward Ukrainian independence (Barrington 1997), toward 
the post-Soviet political and economic system (Barrington 2002, Barrington & Herron 2004, 
Hesli 1995), on support for democratic values (ICDT 2015; Person 2010), and on the degree of 
social capital (Drummond & Lubecki 2010, Katchanovski 2002). Likewise, regional cleavages 
have been very visible in elections ever since Ukraine’s independence in 1991 (Clem & Craumer 
2005; Craumer & Clem 1999, 2008; Birch 2000; Holdar 1995; Kubiek 2000; Katchanovski 
2006; Roper & Fesnic 2003). We will soon look closer at some of these findings, but before we 
do that we will discuss why and how historical legacies play a role in Ukraine’s regional 
divisions. We will start with a historical introduction, proceed with implications of different 
regions’ unequal historical developments, and then look at other possible reasons for regional 
differences in political culture, mainly the geographical distribution of ethnolinguistic and 
religious groups. In the end we will develop a conceptual map of Ukraine which summarizes the 
main factors that are shaping regional patterns of democratic culture, and which will serve as a 
basis for our formulation of three hypotheses. Central in our hypotheses will be three regions 
which are clustered around historical borders. These regions are very similar to each other with 
except for their historical experiences in certain time periods, and by comparing the level of 
democratic culture in these regions we can therefore make precise assessments about the legacies 








4.1 Historical legacies 
We will start by giving a broad overview of the historical geopolitical developments of Ukraine 
that are most central to our analysis. Important here is to show that historical borders were drawn 
in such a way that Ukraine is something akin to a “natural experiment”.19 We will also make 
clear the historical regional divisions of Ukraine, which will be important in our further analysis. 
 
Central to our analysis are the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the period 
1772-1795. In three phases during these years, the whole Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was 
partitioned between the Russian Empire, the Habsburg Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia.20 
For several centuries before this, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had controlled much of 
present-day Ukraine, reaching its maximum in the 17th century. From the 17th century on, the 
Russian Empire gradually expanded into present-day Ukraine, partly to the expense of the 
westward-retreating Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and by the end of the 18th century the 
Russian Empire had incorporated as good as all of region D on Figure 4.1.21 At the dawn of the 
first partition in 1772, regions A, B, and C on Figure 4.1 belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. When the third partition was finished in 1795, region A had become a part of 
the Habsburg Empire, while regions B and C had become a part of the Russian Empire. 
Important here is the way the new borders were drawn. According to Wandycz (1974) and 
Lukowski (1999), the border was decided completely without thought of conditions on the 
ground and did not follow any earlier state or regional border, nor any boundaries between ethnic 
or religious groups or areas with different economic profiles. The new border in other words cut 
right through an otherwise homogeneous area with a homogenous rural peasant population 
consisting of ethnic Ukrainians. Peisakhin (2015, 25-26) see the exact drawing of the border as 
fulfilling criteria to “randomness” and calls the process whereby otherwise very similar 
                                               
19 The term “natural experiment” is used about occurrences in history where different groups of subjects are as-if 
randomly assigned to different treatments, but where the manipulation of the treatments is not under the control of 
the researcher. Such occurrences can be used to study for example the effects of political regimes on populations. Of 
great importance is then that assignment has happened close to random, so that the populations do not differ on other 
variables (Dunning 2012, 15-17). 
20 As the Kingdom of Prussia did not acquire any areas that are part of present-day Ukraine, it will not play any role 
in our further analysis. 







populations suddenly become subject to different political regimes a “natural experiment of 
history”. 
 
Figure 4.1  Historical map of Ukraine 
 
Figure 4.1: Map of Ukraine with historical borders. Regions A, B and C were all part of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth at the onset of its first partition in 1772. When the third partition was completed in 1795, the 
Russian Empire had acquired regions B and C, and the Habsburg Empire had acquired region A. Region A, which is 
called Galicia, belonged to the Galician province of the Habsburg Empire until World War 1, was a part of Poland 
between World War 1 and World War 2, and was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939. Region B, which is 
called Volhynia, belonged to the Russian Empire until World War 1, was a part was of Poland between World War 
1 and World War 2, and was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939. Region C belonged to the Russian Empire 
until World War 1, and then became a part of the Soviet Union from its establishment shortly after World War 1. 
Region D was gradually incorporated into the Russian Empire during the 18th century, and also became a part of the 
Soviet Union from its establishment. As will be commented on later, the historical development of regions X and Y 
are strongly diverging from that of other regions and will not be central in our further analysis.
22
 Sources: Miller, 
White & Heywood (1998, 71), Magocsi (1993, 47), Magocsi (2007, 118, 133), Katchanovski (2006, 85) Peisakhin 
(2015, 26). 
                                               
22 Region X on Figure 4.1, Zakarpattia, became a part of Czechoslovakia after World War 1, while region Y on 
became a part of Romania. Region 1 and region 2 are different from all other regions both in terms historical 
developments and in terms of demography. A study of political culture in these two regions would require high 
survey quality and large samples from these two particular regions. We will not discuss these regions more in this 








The borders between the Russian Empire and the Habsburg Empire23 stayed the same until 
World War 1, when both empires collapsed. A settlement of a new border between the now 
independent Poland and the newly established Soviet Union was agreed in 1921, after the Polish-
Soviet war. The new border was still not based on any ethnographic or other historical 
considerations,24 with an exception for the southernmost part of the border, which would follow 
the old imperial borders (Borzecki 2008, 59-60, 133). Regions A and B on Figure 4.1 now 
belonged to Poland, while regions C and D now belonged to the Soviet Union. On Figure 4.1 we 
can see how the southern part of the border between the Soviet Union and Poland is overlapping 
with the the old imperial borders, and then how borders diverge as one moves from the South to 
the North. 
 
A few comments on the historical divisions are in order before we continue. To summarize, 
region A on Figure 4.1 (Galicia) has experienced Habsburg imperial rule followed by Polish rule 
in the inter-war age, region B (Volhynia) has experienced Russian imperial rule followed by 
Polish rule in the inter-war age, and regions C and D have both experienced Russian imperial 
rule followed by rule by the Soviet Union in the inter-war age. As will be shown in this chapter, 
Regions A, B and C are very similar to each other with except for their distinct regime 
experiences, and they are thus suited for comparison when the aim is to assess the legacies of a 
particular historical regime. We will later explain in detail how we can conduct those 
comparisons. Now we will turn to the historical developments which are thought to have caused 
the emergence of different levels of democratic culture in the different regions. 
4.1.1 Rule by the Habsburg Empire and the Russian Empire (1772-1917/18) 
We will start with a discussion of the most relevant differences in the historical developments of 
the Ukrainian-populated areas of the Habsburg and Russian empires respectively. The key here 
                                               
23 From 1804 until 1867 the formal notion of the Habsburg Empire is the Austrian Empire, and after the 1867 
constitutional changes it is denoted as the Austro-Hungarian Empire. For the sake of clarity we will throughout this 
thesis use the term “Habsburg Empire”. 
24 Ethnographic considerations were taken into account only in the way that Polish factions disagreed on how large 
proportions of non-ethnic Poles could be tolerated in the new Polish state. The borderlands were still charcterized by 
a peasant population of Ukrainians, land-owning Poles and and urban population of Poles and Jews. No “natural” 
ethnographic border could therefore be drawn in this area. For a thorough discussion of the border question, see 







are certain processes which happened in the Habsburg Empire and which did not happen in the 
Russian Empire, namely what Riabchuk (2015, 141) with reference to Eugen Weber’s classic 
book (1976) calls the process of turning “peasants into Ukrainians”. According to authors like 
Dardon & Grzymala-Busse (2006), Kuzio (1998, 2015), Person (2010) and Riabchuk (2015), a 
long-term legacy of this is a particularly high level of democratic political culture in the 
Habsburg province of Galicia (region A on Figure 4.1). 
 
Before we start explaining the particularities of the historical developments in the Habsburg and 
Russian areas, we should make clear some points regarding the ethnographic and economic 
situation. The whole area that had belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772 
(regions A, B and C on Figure 4.1) was characterized by an ethnopolitical situation in the rural 
districts with Ukrainian-speaking peasants and Polish landlords, and where town-populations 
consisted almost exclusively of Poles and Jews (Snyder 2003, 119, 122-123). Religious 
questions were complicated in this area. The Brest Union in 1596 was an agreement whereby the 
Ruthenian Orthodox church inside the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth accepted to be 
underlaid the Pope and become a part of the Catholic Church, while at the same time retaining 
the Orthodox liturgy (Snyder 2003, 107-109). This specific organization became known as the 
Uniate Church or the Greek Catholic Church, and at the onset of the partitions in 1772, the 
formerly Orthodox Ukrainian-speaking peasant population in the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth had largely become adherents to this church. After the partition of the 
Commonwealth from 1772 to 1795, Greek Catholics ended up on both sides of the new border 
between the Russian Empire and the Habsburg Empire. Greek Catholic parishes in the Russian 
Empire were soon converted back into the Orthodox Church, and at the end of the 1830s there 
were close to none Greek Catholic churches left in the Russian Empire (Werth 2014). On the 
Habsburg side of the border the situation was different. As opposed to the Russian Empire, 
where Orthodoxy was the official religion, the official religion of the Habsburg Empire was 
Catholicism. Here, the Greek-Catholic church was promoted as an institution unifying the East 
Slavic population with the Habsburg Empire, and as a bulwark against the Russian Empire 








Many authors have described how a more liberal legal and political environment in the Austrian-
ruled lands allowed for a much higher degree of organizational freedom, political participation 
and spreading of mass-literacy and Ukrainian nationalistic ideas than was the case in the 
Russian-ruled lands, and how this lead to the development of a Ukrainian national identity in the 
Austrian-ruled lands (Hrytsak 2005; Magocsi 2010; Katchanovski 2006; Snyder 2003; Wandycz 
1974). The central institution in the early days of Ukrainian nation building was the Greek 
Catholic Church (Snyder 2003 123-124). Members of the Greek Catholic Clergy had access to 
university education already from the late 18th century, were in close contact with enlightenment 
circles in Vienna (Stepien 2005, 66), and were encouraged by Habsburg authorities to write the 
first books on Ukrainian national history (Hrytsak 2005, 193-194). The Habsburg authorities 
were at this point keen on encouraging the development of a Ukrainian identity, as Ukrainians 
could be a counterweight to the independence claims of the Polish population. Ukrainian identity 
developed first in opposition to Polish identity, and later became incompatible also with any 
Russian identity or loyalty to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Greek Catholic Church made it 
their primary concern from the 1880s to reach out to the peasantry and spread the ideas of 
“national justice” for the Ukrainians and opened hundreds of schools with a national orientation 
and education in the Ukrainian vernacular (Snyder 2003, 124-125). The upper classes in Galicia 
could participate in elections from the 1860s, and voting rights were extended to larger parts of 
the population in the 1907 parliamentary election (Katchanovski 2006, 133). Ukrainians in the 
Habsburg Empire thus participated in elections, and a dense network of civil society 
organizations helped mobilize masses in this regard. The electoral participation was a 
representational improvement, and it further increased the national consciousness of the 
Ukrainian population (Birch 2000, 1021). From the late 19th century a secular Ukrainian 
national elite took over from the clergy as the main force of nation-building. Central in the 
foundation of the Ukrainian national myth was historian Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, who constructed 
a Ukrainian national narrative that laid claim to the heritage of Kievan Rus and refuted the claim 
of Russian historiography that Moscow inherited the traditions of Kievan Rus (Snyder 2003, 
128-129). Russian and Ukrainian historiographies and national myths were thus highly 
incompatible with each other, with the political implication that Russia’s claim to Ukraine was 









The legal and political environment in the Russian Empire did not allow for the same 
developments as in the Habsburg Empire. Russia was an autocratic Empire which did not allow 
for the spread of ideas which could undermine the legitimacy of Tsarist absolutist rule. 
Ukrainians were officially called “Little-Russians”, and were not seen as a separate ethnic group 
or nation. Rather, there was an emphasis on the very close historic affinity between the Eastern 
Slavic peoples of “Little Russians” (Ukrainians) and “Great Russians” (Russians) 
(Katchanovski 2006, 131-132; Magocsi 2007, 157). There were some articulations of Ukrainian 
patriotism in intellectual circles at the Kharkiv university in the 1820s and 1830s (Snyder 2003, 
121), but from the 1840s the Imperial authorities became increasingly concerned with the 
possibility of Ukrainian separatism (Magocsi 2007, 158). Official repression against a beginning 
Ukrainian national movement in the 1860s made national agitators leave for the Habsburg 
Empire (Hrytsak 2005, 195). In the Russian Empire all publication and import of works in 
Ukrainian language was banned (Snyder 2003, 121-122), and Ukrainian political organizations 
and associations were not allowed (Katchanovski 2006, 131). The re-incorporation of the Greek 
Catholic Church into the Orthodox Church was a move that further denied the existence of an 
independent Ukrainian cultural institution. At the time of the collapse of the Russian Empire, the 
idea that Ukrainians might form a nationality of their own was spread only in small intellectual 
circles and was totally unknown among the vast majority of the population (Magocsi 2007, 158-
159). 
 
Ukrainian national identity was promoted in the Habsburg province of Galicia by a high number 
of educational, religious, cultural and political organizations, including the Prosvita society, 
which established three thousand reading rooms and libraries in the villages (Katchanovski 2006, 
130). A result of this was that the Ukrainian national identity became widespread in Galicia, also 
in the peasant population (Katchanovski 2006, 132; Hrytsak 2005 197-198), and Riabchuk 
(2015, 141) sees the process of turning peasants into Ukrainians as basically completed in 
Galicia by the end of the 19th century. This Ukrainian national identity was exclusive in the way 
that it was not compatible with any kind of Russian or East Slavic identity. Meanwhile, the 







remained either pre-modern local identities or identification as Eastern Slavs or Little Russians 
(Kuzio 2015, 14; Magocsi 2007, 158-159). 
 
As we discussed in Chapter 3.2.1.1, support for democracy has been much higher in political 
communities with a fully developed perception of themselves as a nation. This is also the claim 
of those who support the idea of a more democratic culture in the former Habsburg areas of 
Ukraine. The connection between Ukrainian identity and democratic values has been 
investigated by Stephen Shulman, and his scheme (2005) of two competing identity complexes 
in Ukraine has received support among scholars of Ukraine (Barrington & Faranda 2009; Kuzio 
2015; Riabchuk 2015). He finds two separate concepts of Ukrainian identity which he calls the 
“ethnic Ukrainian identity complex” and the “East Slavic identity complex”. Those adhering to 
the ethnic Ukrainian identity consider exclusively Ukrainian ethnicity, language and culture as 
unifying features of the Ukrainian nation, see Ukrainians as historically and culturally associated 
with Europe, and see Russia as the main “Other”. Those adhering to the East Slavic identity, on 
the other hand, consider ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians as extremely close and brotherly, 
see Ukrainians as historically and culturally associated with Russia, and see Europe as the main 
“Other”. Through survey analysis Shulman (2005, 81-82) finds that while adherence to the 
ethnic Ukrainian identity is leading to support for democracy, adherence to the East Slavic 
identity is hindering support for democracy. Shulman treats the two identities as ideal types and 
sees it such that people to a smaller or larger degree will adhere to one of these ideal types. 
 
We have now seen how differences in democratic political culture may have emerged between 
the Habsburg province of Galicia (Region A on Figure 4.1) on the one hand, and the areas that 
belonged to the Russian Empire (Regions B, C and D on Figure 4.1) on the other. We will now 
turn to the developments after World War 1, when new states had succeeded the old empires, and 
new borders were in place. 
4.1.2 Rule by Poland and the Soviet Union (1921-1939) 
After World War 1, when the empires had collapsed, and borders had been changed, the 
Habsburg province of Galicia (region A on Figure 4.1) became a part of Poland and was joined 







Regions B and C on Figure 4.1 went from Russian imperial rule to rule by the Soviet Union. In 
the inter-war period the populations of Poland and the Soviet Union lived in radically different 
political regimes, which are proposed to have left legacies in the form of different democratic 
political cultures. 
 
Birch emphasizes the importance of the electoral participation of Ukrainians in Poland in the 
inter-war period (Birch 2000, 1022, 1025). She thinks that the experience of living under a 
democratic regime and taking part in elections may have left a lasting legacy in the form of a 
more democratic political culture in the areas of Ukraine that was a part of Poland in the inter-
war years. This is also what Katchanovski (2018) holds as a possibility. Polish authorities placed 
some restrictions on Ukrainian cultural and political institutions, most notably by demanding that 
Ukrainian-language schools should become bilingual (Snyder 2003, 144). Still, Ukrainian civil 
society was by and large allowed to continue to function in Galicia, and there were now attempts 
to spread the Ukrainian organizations and national ideas also into Volhynia (Snyder 2003, 144-
148). However, the territorial organization of the inter-war age lasted only for around 20 years, 
and the primary question with regards to legacy effects is perhaps not the impact of Polish rule in 
Galicia and Volhynia (regions A and B on Figure 4.1), but rather the impact of Stalinism on the 
Soviet side of the border (regions C and D on Figure 4.1). 
 
The inter-war period was a period of particulary strong repression in the Soviet Union. The man-
made famine of 1932-33, called Holodomor,25 resulted in 3,9 million excess deaths in the 
Ukrainian Soviet Republic (Rudnytskyi et al. 2015). It is widely thought that this period of 
famine “broke the back” of the Ukrainian peasantry, meaning that they became obedient to the 
authorities and only developed a low level of political consciousness (Arel 2005, 45-46). A look 
at the regional pattern of population decline in this period (Figure 4.2) reveals some notable 
regional variations. Plokhy (2015) and Wolowyna et al. (2016) have investigated these regional 
patterns and hold that the (present day) oblasts of Khmelnytsk, Zhytomyr and Vinnytsia (regions 
                                               
25 This happened as a consequence of the implementation of Stalin’s plans of forced collectivization and rapid 
industrialization. The authorities ordered the collective farms to fullfill extremely high grain quota in order to feed 
the expanding labour force, and also in order to export grain. Resistance to collectivization, or faliure to fullfill the 
grain quotas, resulted in harsh penalties in the form of confiscation of all grain and deportation of wealthier farmers. 
Among the nationalities of the Soviet Union Ukrainians were particularly targeted as famine victims in order to 







8-10) had lower excess losses due to their closeness to the Soviet Union’s western borders. They 
hold that the Soviet authorities tried to avoid showing the worst consequences of the famine 
along their borders with other countries, and Plokhy (2015, 404-405) points out that many in this 
area also may have survived by crossing the border into Poland. The areas with the highest losses 
are can be seen as a dark belt in the central and eastern areas in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2       Population decline in percentage, 1929-1933 
 
Figur 4.2: The impact of the famine was uneven across the Ukrainian territories. There is a belt of oblasts in the 
central and eastern part of the country with very high population decline. The areas closest to the Western border 
were comparatively less affected. Source: Klid & Motyl (2012, xlvii) 
 
We have now seen how seen how differences in democratic political culture may have emerged 
in the inter-war age between the areas that belonged to Poland on the one hand (Regions A and B 
on Figure 4.1), and the areas that belonged to the Soviet Union on the other (Regions C and D on 
Figure 4.1). We have also seen that the impact of the most repressive measures in the Soviet 
Union in this period, the Holodomor, was uneven across the territories of regions C and D on 
Figure 4.1. In the rest of this chapter we will look at other factors which may influence 
Ukraine’s political culture, and we will also make sure that there are not any later historical 
developments which to a substantial degree are working as confounding variables in the causal 
relationship between the historical developments we have discussed and present-day outcomes in 
terms of commitment to democratic values. We will also look at other cleavages in the Ukrainian 
society and see why these need to be eliminated as the causes behind Ukraine’s regional 
divisions. Before we do that, we will look at the research that has been done on historical 







4.1.3 Research on historical legacies in Ukraine 
Historical legacies have received much attention in Ukraine as an explanation for mass attitudes 
and value orientations. Many see the country’s election results as to a large degree reflecting 
historical legacies in the form of regional political cultures and identities. Together with survey 
analyses, analyses of election results have been most prominent in the research on historical 
legacies in Ukraine. As voting patterns can say less directly about people’s value orientations 
than can a survey, we will not make voting patterns the main topic here. Still, we will start here 
by looking at how election results have been interpreted as reflecting historical legacies. 
 
The most divisive issue in Ukrainian society, which was structuring for the emerging party 
system, was the question of how relations between Ukraine and Russia should be (Hesli, 
Reisinger & Miller 1998). Connected with this question have also been questions about regime 
form and economic system as well as relations with the West. Ever since independence in 1991 
Ukrainian elections have been characterized by very visible regional splits, and the battle for 
presidency has generally been between a candidate with a power base in the West of the country, 
and an opponent with a power base in the East, where the main lines of conflict have been a 
combination of the factors mentioned above, and where parties most strongly backing 
democratic reform and foreign policy orientations toward the West have been far more popular 
in the West than in the East (Holdar 1995, Kubicek 2000, Kuzio 2015).26,27 The areas that 
belonged to Poland in the interwar-age, and the former Habsburg province of Galicia in 
particular, have continued to be a stronghold for candidates backing democratic reform and 
cooperation with the West, and people in these areas have been shunning parties and candidates 
that are associated with the former Soviet regime or are backing cooperation with Russia. But 
even though there is a broad agreement that election results are to a large degree reflecting 
historical legacies, it is difficult to make precise assessments of people’s value commitments 
based on election results. 
 
                                               
26 This is of course a very crude typology, and other issues have of course also been important. However, a general 
tendency is visible, and that is what is important here. For more detailed descriptions of issues, parties and 
candidates in Ukrainian elections, see for example D’Anieri (2007) or Kuzio (2015).  
27 Parliamentary elections and first rounds of presidential elections have been less polarized, but also here regional 







Surveys, however, are better suited for studying values and beliefs. In the introduction to Chapter 
4 we saw that survey evidence have shown strong regional divisions in Ukraine on a range of 
attitudes and values. However, a general problem with survey evidence from Ukraine is that 
sample sizes and degree of regional representativeness of surveys are not very high. This makes 
it difficult to make precise assessments about where eventual geographical boundaries in 
attitudes and value orientations can be found, which again makes it difficult to tell if eventual 
regional differences in political culture are resulting from legacies from the imperial period or 
the inter-war age.28 This is generally a problem also among the studies that have been done on 
the connection between historical legacies and Ukraine’s democratic political culture, and 
especially in the oldest of these studies. Miller, White & Heywood (1998) do not find a more 
democratic political culture in Western Ukraine than in Central or Eastern Ukraine, but what 
they called “Western Ukraine” do not correspond well with any of the regions that we have 
defined in this chapter. The same is the case for Shulman (2005), who did not find more support 
for democracy in Western Ukraine than in other regions of the country. Miller, Klobucar & 
Reisinger (2000), who are making a crude division of Ukraine into to equally big halves, also did 
not find any effect on commitment to democratic values from living in Western Ukraine. They 
suggest that regional differences can be explained by the ethnolinguistic or religious composition 
of the populations in different regions. We will look into the claim about ethnolinguistic and 
religious composition as being the real reason behind Ukraine’s regional divisions later, but we 
will first look at the findings from newer studies. 
  
Person (2010) finds that residence in Galicia (region A on Figure 4.1) is leading to higher 
support for democratic values. Katchanovski (2018) is analyzing all the areas that did not belong 
to the Soviet Union before World War 2 (regions A, B, X and Y on Figure 4.1) as one single 
region, and do not find that residence in this region leads to more support for democratic values. 
ICDT (2015), however, who is analyzing the same region as Katchanovski, do find that 
residence in this region leads to more support for democratic values. However, there are 
methodological problems connected with these studies as well, as we will discuss closer in 
Chapter 4.5. Before we do that we will look at other factors which may be affecting Ukraine’s 
                                               
28 As we have seen in this chapter, we will expect that regional differences in political culture which are caused by 







regional pattern of democratic political culture. We will start by discussing other political 
developments, before we continue with economic factors and factors connected with 
ethnolinguistic and religious groups. 
4.2 Other developments 
In 1939, as a part of the fulfillment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviet Union invaded 
Poland and captured Galicia and Volhynia (regions A and B on Figure 4.1) (Magocsi 2007, 268-
271). In 1941 Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union, and between 1941 and 1944 the front 
line moved twice through the entire areas of Ukraine, as the German army firstly advanced 
eastward, followed by the westward advancement and recapture of Ukraine by the Red Army 
(2007, 283-288). All of Ukraine was affected by this, and much of the country was devastated. 
Among the consequences was that almost the entire Jewish population of Ukraine was 
exterminated (2007, 282). Also, almost the entire Polish population was either driven out or 
killed, many as a part of a conflict between Ukrainian and Poles in Galicia and Volhynia (Snyder 
2007). These murders were perpetrated by far-right militant groups that initially collaborated 
with the German occupational authorities before turning against them when it became clear that 
the Germans would not accept the creation of a Ukrainian state. These groups, motivated by 
resistance to the Soviet occupation by Galicia from 1939, continued to fight against the Soviet 
Union after World War 2 and into the 1950s.29 Snyder (2003) and Kuzio (2015) see this 
resistance as a step in the solidifying of a Ukrainian identity among the population. 
 
Since the final incorporation of all of Western Ukraine into the Soviet Union in 1945, all of 
present-day Ukraine has been a part of the same country - from 1945 to 1991 as a part of the 
                                               
29 The growth of far-right groups in Western Ukraine must be seen on the background of the squeeze between the 
Stalinist Soviet Union and Nazi Germany after 1939. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was 
originally created in 1929 by young Ukrainians who were dissatisfied that no Ukrainian state was created after 
World War 1 and stood for an un-democratic nationalism with the goal to create a dictatorial state. The OUN was far 
from popular and needed the circumstances of war in order to grow (Snyder 2007, 152). The democratic party 
Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO) was the largest Ukrainian party at the onset of the war, but as it 
became dissolved together with other Ukrainian political parties, OUN became the only political organization left on 
the stage in western Ukraine (Snyder 2007, 164). The strongest faction of OUN, OUN-Bandera, in 1942 created the 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which at the same time fought against Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and 
Polish guerilla forces, and also conducted ethnic cleansing of Poles in areas that they considered as Ukrainian. For 
more about the special war-time circumstances that lead to the growth of far-right groups and the bloodshed between 







Soviet Union, and since 1991 as a sovereign country.30 What has happened after this is thus of 
less direct interest to us, as the topic of this thesis is regime legacies from before World War 2. 
However, we explained in Chapter 4.1 how the historical divisions of Ukraine made parts of the 
country into something akin to a natural experiment, and we will now make sure that later 
developments are not working as confounding variables. In other words, we will now have a 
short look at other political and economic developments that may have had an impact on the 
regional outlook of Ukraine’s political culture. 
4.2.1 Political developments after World War 2 
In the course of the life of the Soviet Union, every citizen of Ukraine was subject to the same 
political regime. The most notable regional differences in political treatment in this period 
occurred during World War 2, when many thousand suspected political opponents were 
deported, and in the immediate post-War years, when collectivization was undertaken in Western 
Ukraine (this had already happened in the rest of Ukraine before World War 2), as well as the 
campaign against nationalist insurgents which continued until the 1950s. It is often thought that 
this harsh period in particular, and Soviet rule in general, did not weaken, but rather strengthened 
the national identity and self-perceptions of Ukrainians in the former Habsburg area (Kuzio 
2015, 28). Person (2010) sees the period of Soviet occupation as a period when the pro-
democratic elements of the Ukrainian identity were particularly strengthened, as hatred toward 
the communist regime lead to a strengthening of democratic sentiments.31 
 
                                               
30 Changes of borders between the Soviet Republics made Crimea into a part of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in 
1954, but no later changes happened in the West of Ukraine, which is our main area of interest. In 2014 Russia 
annexed Crimea, which is now totally outside of control of the Ukrainian authorities. The ongoing war in Donbass, 
which started in 2014, has also left much of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast outside of control of the Ukrainian state. 
31 As there were no real elections and no relevant surveys being done in Soviet times, we do not know much about 
people's values and attitudes during these years. What we do know, however, is that there has been a continuing 
resistance against Soviet rule in Western parts of Ukraine from World War 2 and throughout the lifetime of the 
Soviet Union. Nationalistic guerilla groups that had been fighting against the Soviet Union in the World War 2 
continued to fight in Western Ukraine well into the 1950s. There is further a very visible pattern of dissent. In the 
post-Stalin age and until a major crackdown on Ukrainian dissent in 1972, there emerged a high number of cultural 
and human rights activists from Western Ukraine. Of all political prisoners in the Soviet GULAG-system, 40 % 
were Ukrainians, and the vast majority of these came from Western and Central Ukraine. Even though 20 % of the 
country’s population and 30 % of the urban population were Russians, there was close to none dissent among this 







There is no space here for a thorough explanation of the political developments in Ukraine from 
its independence and up until now.32 We should, however, discuss the most dramatic events in 
this period, and the impact these may have had on patterns of political culture. This includes the 
Orange revolution in 2004, and the Euromaidan protests and revolution in 2014 and subsequent 
annexation of Crimea by Russia and the war in Donbass.33 Leading up to the Orange revolution 
in 2004 was a voter realignment in Central Ukraine. This could, if anything, indicate a 
diminishing of political-cultural differences between Western and Central Ukraine, as value 
orientations that had earlier largely been confined to Western Ukraine had now also spread to the 
youth population in Central Ukraine (Kuzio 2006, 64). Arel (2005, 45-46) notes that a 
realignment had also happened among the Ukrainian-speaking peasant population in Central 
Ukraine, meaning that in Central Ukraine rural residence and young age were now determinants 
for opposition support and support for integration into Europe. The revolutionary events of 2004 
themselves are shown by Barrington (2012) and Katchanovski (2014) to not have had a lasting 
impact on the regional pattern of mass attitudes and voting patterns.34 
 
The Euromaidan protests and revolution in 2014 and subsequent annexation of Crimea by Russia 
and War in Donbass should also be commented on here. The sum of these events is even more 
serious for the population than the Orange Revolution in 2004. To begin with we should 
comment on the special historical developments of Crimea and Donbass and the goal of our 
study. The goal of our study is to explore how different empires and states have left legacies in 
the form of different levels of democratic political culture. Our focus is less on internal 
differences inside the areas that have been subject to the same historical regimes, and as will be 
explained in Chapter 5.4.3, our survey and method is not particularly well suited for identifying 
single historical factors that have given rise to historical legacies in other cases than where a 
historical border has divided an otherwise similar area and population. Crimea and Donbass 
stand out from the rest of the country in multiple ways. Donbass was subject to industrialization 
                                               
32 Some of the developments and emerging cleavages have been commented on in Chapter 3.1.3. 
33 “Donbass” here refers to the easternmost oblasts of Donetsk and Lugansk, region 24 on 25 on Figure 2.1 
respectively. 
34 Important to us here is that there is no reason to believe that regional differences in democratic political culture 
between areas corresponding to former borders have appeared in this period. As we have seen, indications rather 
point in the opposite direction, as nationalistic, pro-western and pro-democratic ideas now seem to have gotten a 
foothold also in central Ukraine. Thus, a test of differences in democratic political culture across old imperial- and 







already in imperial times and experienced very rapid industrialization and urbanization in the 
Soviet Union in the 1920s and 30s, when high numbers of people migrated to Donbass both from 
Russia and from other parts of Ukraine. This uprooted population never developed strong 
attachments to a Ukrainian identity, but instead identified with their industry, with the Soviet 
state and with their region (Osipian & Osipian 2006). In terms of values and culture Riabchuk 
(2009) considers Donbass as the region with the strongest Sovietophile and authoritarian 
attitudes in Ukraine, and therefore standing in stark contrast to the westernmost parts of Ukraine, 
were national consciousness and liberal-democratic values are most prevalent (2009, 77-79). 
Crimea was transferred from the Russian Soviet republic to the Ukrainian Soviet republic only in 
1954, has a long history of hosting Russian and Soviet fleet bases, and is geographically 
separated from the rest of Ukraine It is the only region in Ukraine with an ethnic Russian 
majority, and also has a substantial minority of Crimean Tatars. These features make Crimea a 
special case that stand out from the rest of Ukraine in terms of historical legacies and identity 
(Sasse 2007). Resentments in these regions against the 2014 revolution has been exploited by 
Russia, who annexed Crimea in 2014, and who has supported separatists in Donbass since the 
outbreak of war in 2014. 
 
It has been shown that there has indeed been a shift in mass attitudes and national identification 
in parts of Ukraine after these events (Kulyk 2016, 2017). A larger part of the population now 
self-identifies primarily as Ukrainian, while fewer primarily adhere to East-Slavic or local 
identities.35 Support for a close relationship between Ukraine and Russia has also gone down, 
while support for a closer relationship to the West has gone up. What has happened is that 
identities and sentiments that earlier were confined only to Western Ukraine now has spread also 
to larger parts of the population further East. This again, points toward a diminishing of 
differences in political culture between western Ukraine and the rest of the country. 
Katchanovski (2014), however, finds that Ukraine remain regionally divided in terms of political 
attitudes, but the main point here is that there is no reason to believe that regional differences in 
democratic political culture between areas corresponding to former imperial- and state borders 
have appeared in this period. Still, in order to show that regional differences in democratic 
political culture between areas with different historical legacies have not appeared as a reaction 
                                               







to the above-mentioned events, we will utilize two surveys - one from before and one from after 
2014.36  
4.2.2 Economic developments 
Economic development is found to be an important factor which causes changes in political 
culture and should thus be taken into consideration in this analysis. The most important dividing 
line in Ukraine in economic terms is the one that divide the South-East from the North-West, as 
can be seen in Figure 4.3. While the areas to the Northwest of this line are less urbanized and 
dominated by agriculture and some light industry, the areas to the Southwest of this line are 
heavily urbanized and industrialized (Birch 2000, 1026-1027; Riabchuk 2009, 21). This 
characteristic geographical pattern of industrialization is connected with Ukraine’s topography 
and the Russian Empire’s colonization of Ukraine.  
 
Figure 4.3  Main economical and topographical dividing line 
 
Figure 4.3: Main line of division between the heavily industrialized Southeast and less industrialized Northwest 
Source: Birch (2000), Riabchuk (2009). 
 
The process leading up to this division began as the Russian Empire gained control over the 
steppe area (region B on Figure 4.3) in the course of the 18th century and realized this flat and 
open area’s potential for agriculture on an industrial scale. From this followed processing plants 
for agricultural products, and then textile industry and other industry on a vast scale. In the 
eastern part of the steppe area large-scale mining industry begun in the 19th century (Magocsi 
                                               







2007, 143-148). A major colonization project was undertaken, and immigration was encouraged 
both from other parts of the Russian Empire and from other countries, as urban centers grew 
rapidly (Magocsi 2007, 159-165). 
 
The forested plains to the Northwest were later incorporated into the Russian Empire, and were 
for topographical reasons less suited for the kind of large-scale agricultural industry which had 
started the industrialization of much of the Southeast. On the Habsburg side of the border the 
situation was similar. Galicia was an economically very backward part of the Habsburg Empire 
and stayed largely dependent on small-scale agriculture. The areas that were incorporated into 
the Soviet Union from Poland in 1939 thus were all economically backward, as were the adjacent 
areas that had been a part of the Soviet Union from 1921. While the industrialization of the 
Southeast continued through the Soviet times, the Northwest largely stayed economically 
underdeveloped (Birch 2000, 126-127). 
 
Despite a general economic downturn in the first years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
regional economic outlook remained largely the same. The economically most successful areas 
in the transition period were the southeastern oblasts of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia and 
wages and living standards have generally been higher and unemployment lower in the 
southeastern areas (and Kiev) than in the northwestern areas (Birch 2000, 1028). Figure 4.4 
illustrates the pattern of urbanization according to the latest census, while Figure 4.5 and Figure 
4.6 show the Regional Domestic Product (RDP) per capita for the year of our first survey (2007) 
and the closest we can get data to our second survey (the economic data are from 2015, while the 
second survey is from 2018). What we can see from these is that there is a very clear East-West 
dimension both in terms of urbanization and RDP, and that this division is persisting.37 Important 
for our further analysis here is also that the area to the west of Kiev is still a homogenous area 





                                               
37 As we move from the poorer and more rural West to the richer and more urban East there is a more gradual rise in 
terms of urbanization and RDP than a crude North-West/South-East dichotomization implies, but a clear line can be 







Figure 4.4. Percentage urban population in oblasts 
 
Figure 4.4: A trend of rising proportion of urban population is visible as one moves from the West to the East, and 
also the line of division between the Southeast and Northwest is visible. Source: All-Ukrainian Population Census 
2001.38 Retrieved from: State Statistic Committee of Ukraine’s webpage “Urban and rural population” (n. d.). 
 
Figure 4.5, Regional Domestic Product per capita in UAH39, 2007                                              
 
 
Figure 4.5: The heavily industrialized areas in the East are most economically successful. Also Kiev City and Kiev 
oblast have a high Regional Domestic Product. Western parts of the country are generally the poorest. Source: 
Osaulenko (2009, 14). 
 




Figure 4.6: The situation in 2015 was much the same as in 2007. The East plus the City of Kiev and Kiev oblast are 
richest, the West is poorest. Source: Verner (2017, 18). 
                                               
38 The All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001 is the latest census of Ukraine. 
39 Ukrainian Hryvnia.  
40 Data cannot be obtained from Donetsk and Lugansk for this year due to the war, and not from Crimea, due to the 







4.3 Societal Cleavages 
The goal of this study is to investigate regional differences in political culture, and the main 
purpose of including ethnic and linguistic variables is thus to make sure that any regional effects 
found are not a result of certain ethnic or linguistic groups being concentrated in certain areas. 
Ethnicity and language are generally known as possible determinants of mass attitudes, also in 
Ukraine specifically. However, in order to understand why this is the case we will have to look 
into how ethnic and linguistic cleavages are to be understood in the Ukrainian case, and how the 
ethnic and linguistic boundaries have been changing. 
4.3.1 Ethnolinguistic cleavages 
Some authors have suggested that linguistic and ethnic divisions is the real reason behind 
Ukraine’s regional divisions (Arel 1998, Miller, Klobucar & Reisinger 2000). These cleavages 
must be understood on the background of the nation building policies of previous and present 
political regimes. As we have seen, a result of the different nationality policies of the Habsburg 
Empire as compared to the Russian Empire was that in the former case a mutually exclusive 
Ukrainian national identity had emerged, while this did not happen in the latter case. The 
existence of a Ukrainian Soviet Republic further increased the awareness of the Ukrainian 
nationality, but there was at the same time an official emphasis both on the closeness of the 
Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian national groups, as well as on the overarching Soviet identity. 
In the East the situation persisted where people generally were not holders of any mutually 
exclusive identities, and in addition to Ukrainian, Soviet and East Slavic identities, they could at 
the same time identify by local or regional identities or as belonging to Eastern Orthodoxy 
(Kuzio 2015, 216). A high number of Russians migrated to industrial cities in the East, and these 
largely also adhered to the kind of multiple, blurred identities as eastern Ukrainians did. 
 
In the Soviet Union Russian language was considered the language of prestige, and a command 
of Russian was a necessity for social mobility. This, in combination with periods of active 
suppression of Ukrainian language and culture, caused a significant proportion of the ethnic 







urban areas and higher positions (Kulyk 2011).41  Many Ukrainians started to declare as their 
native language not their language of daily communication (Russian), but the language of the 
ethnic group they felt closest to, the language that they thought should be privileged in society, 
or the language that their parents spoke (Ukrainian) (Kulyk 2011, Olzansky 2012).42 
 
We can thus find three main combinations of language use and ethnicity in Ukraine: Ukrainian-
speaking Ukrainians, Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russian-speaking Russians.43 Russian-
speaking Ukrainians are found to be less likely than Ukrainian-speakers to primarily identify as 
Ukrainians, and more likely to retain local or regional identities (Kulyk 2017). Barrington & 
Herron (2004) and Barrington & Faranda (2009) find that that language and ethnicity do have an 
impact on mass attitudes on regime support and foreign policy preferences, although less than 
region of residence. Khmelko & Wilson (1998) find Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians to be 
preferring the most nationalistic and pro-European candidates and policies, Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians less supportive of these, and Russians the least supportive. Regarding support for 
democracy there are somewhat opposing findings, as Dowley and Silver (2002, 517) find that 
there is less support for democracy among ethnic Russians than ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine, 
Barrington & Herron (2004, 67) find that Russian-speakers and mixed-speakers are less 
supportive of democracy than Ukrainian-speakers, while Miller, Klobucar & Reisinger (2000, 
225) find that Russian-speakers are more supportive of democracy than Ukrainian-speakers. One 
reason for the contradicting findings may be the different ways of conceptualizing ethnic and 
linguistic groups.44 Way (2010, 147) support a notion that the language people actually prefer to 
                                               
41 This language shift was facilitated by the closeness of the two languages, and it was thus a much smaller step for 
Ukrainians to shift to Russian than would be the case for natives of many other titular national groups of the Soviet 
Union. 
42  According to a survey covering the population of Ukraine, a third of the respondents understand “native 
language” as the language in which they think and talk freely, another third understands it as the language of the 
nation they belong to, and the rest understand it as either the language of one’s parents or the language one speaks 
most often (Olzansky 2012). 
43 In addition to this there are significant groups of ethnic Ukrainians who are constantly switching between the two 
languages, or who speak a mix of the two languages, called surzhyk. More about this phenomenon, and how this 
group is viewed in terms of ethnic group belonging can be found in Bernsand (2000) and Olzansky (2012). There 
are also several small ethnic and linguistic minorities in Ukraine that we will not focus on here. Notably, the two 
oblasts of Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi stand out as oblasts with sizable minorities. 
44 According to the latest census (from 2001), 78 % of the population is ethnic Ukrainian, while ethnic Russians 
number 17 % of the population. 68 % of the population states Ukrainian as their native language, while 30 % states 
Russian (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2018). However, according to Kulyk (2011), probably less than half 







speak is a better indicator of identity, and thus also values and attitudes, than their stated native 
language. The map shown in Figure 4.9 is based on Khmelko (2004, 11, 13), who combines 
evidence from a high number of surveys in order to find out how many who actually do speak 
Ukrainian when given the choice between Ukrainian and Russian.45 
 
As we can see when we compare Figure 4.9 with Figure 4.8, the proportion of Ukrainian 
speakers falls off much faster as one move eastward than do the proportion of people who report 
Ukrainian as their native language. Only in the westernmost region, region 1, in Figure 4.9 is the 
proportion of active Ukrainian speakers at the same level as the proportion of people who report 
Ukrainian as their native language. In Figure 4.7 we see that proportion of Ukrainians by 
nationality falls of slower than language as one moves from the West to the East. 
 
 
Figure 4.7      Percentage ethnic Ukrainians by oblast 
 
Source: All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001. Retrieved from State Statistics Committee of Ukraine’s webpage 











                                               
45 The vast majority of those who do not choose to speak Ukrainian choose Russian, while there is also a group 







Figure 4.8     Percentage self-reported native                     Figure 4.9       Percentage actual Ukrainian 
Ukrainian-speakers by oblast                                                                    speakers by macroregion  
 
 
Source: All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001.                 Source: Khmelko (2004, 13). The five regions 
Retrieved from: Databank of State Statistics                        on this map are the ones for which Khmelko 
Service of Ukraine’s webpage “Distribution                        calculates the proportion of Ukrainian-speakers and   
of the population of Ukraine’s regions by                            have no other significance. 
native language” (n. d.).                                                                    
 
 
A couple of findings about changes in national identification among the ethnolinguistic groups 
after Euromaidan and the War in Donbass should be commented on here. Kulyk (2017, 9) finds 
that while there are signs that Russian-speakers in the north-western part of Ukraine increasingly 
identify primarily as Ukrainians after Euromaidan and the War in Donbass, the opposite trend is 
visible in the Southeast. In sum the proportion of Russian-speakers who primarily identify as 
Ukrainian is stable at around 40 %. Among the rest of the population (primarily Ukrainian-
speakers) the proportion who primarily identify as Ukrainian has risen from 60 % to 75 % 
between 2012 and 2014.46 There is in other words an increasing gap between Russian- and 
Ukrainian-speakers in terms of the proportion who primarily identifies as Ukrainian. Pop-
Eleches & Robertson (2018) likewise find no signs of a weakening of ethnolinguistic group as a 
marker of political values, attitudes and identity in the same period, but rather see some signs of 
a strengthening of this cleavage (2018, 116). 
                                               







4.3.2 Religious cleavages 
We have in Chapter 4.1 commented on the history of the Greek-Catholic Church in Ukraine, and 
as can be seen from Figure 4.10, the demographic situation with regards to Greek Catholics 
versus Orthodox believers is still quite similar to what it was a hundred years ago. 
 
Figure 4.10     Percentage Greek Catholics by oblast47 
 
Source: Polishchuk (2015). 
 
In 1946, when the westernmost parts of present-day Ukraine had recently been incorporated into 
the Soviet Union, a very rare example of forcible mass conversion ordered by the Central 
Committee of the Communist party in the Soviet Union found place, as Greek Catholic parishes 
were turned Russian Orthodox. This was probably a part of a plan to make the former inhabitants 
of the Habsburg Empire into loyal Soviet Ukrainians and make it easier to control their minds 
through a single religious body (Jepsen 2005) and have them accept the official historiography 
that saw Ukrainian history only as a part of a wider Russian history (David 2018). This made the 
Greek Catholic church to disappear from the surface of Ukrainian society and continue its 
activities as the world's largest underground church (Kuzio 2015, 150). The Greek Catholic 
church became a center of resistance against Soviet rule and a promoter of democracy and 
Ukrainian national identity, especially after being supported by John Paul II, who was elected 
Pope in 1978 (Kuzio 2015, 150). In 1989 many of the parishes that had been converted to 
Russian Orthodoxy by force in 1946 started defecting to the Greek Catholic church. However, 
not everyone wanted such a return or did not want to be subjected to the Pope, and many of the 
parishes in Galicia that wanted to stay orthodox joined the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox 
                                               
47 As these oblast-wise data are collected in 2015, there are no data shown for Crimea. However, only two percent 
of the population in Crimea belongs to another denomination or religion than one of the Orthodox churches or Islam 







Church (Jepsen 2005). The Greek Catholic Church thus does not have a full monopoly among 
the faithful in Galicia today, and the proportion of Greek Catholics is between 50 % and 60 % in 
all three oblasts of Galicia. 
 
We have already mentioned Pop-Eleches & Tucker (2017) who find strong evidence that 
Catholics in former communist countries have a stronger commitment to democratic values than 
others. Their proposed reason for this is that the Pope served as an external authority who spoke 
against the communist authorities, as well as the general anti-communist messages spread by the 
church. Both of these factors should also apply to the special denominational construction of the 
Greek Catholic Church. Katchanovski (2018) does find that Greek Catholics are more committed 
to democratic values than others, and Drummond & Lubecki (2010) find that churchgoers in 
Galicia have the highest level of turnout in Ukrainian elections and infer from this that the Greek 
Catholic Church serves as a transmitter of civic values. 
4.4 A conceptual map of Ukraine 
The conceptual map (Table 4.1) summarizes the geographical distribution of factors that are 
thought to shape democratic political culture. Oblasts in the same category are clustered 
according to their geographical clustering, and each of these clusters is given a name by which 
we will refer to them. The geographical clusters of oblasts are also similar on other variables are 
not mentioned on the conceptual map. Zhytomyr, Vinnitsya and Khmelnytsk, which are grouped 
together as “West Central”, in their entirety belonged to the Polish-Commonwealth at the onset 
of the first partition, while all the five oblasts which are grouped together as “Central” either 
partly or in their entirety belonged to the Russian Empire at the same point in time (this can be 
seen from Figure 4.1). Also, none of the oblasts grouped as “West Central” were among the 
worst affected by Holodomor, while several of those oblasts grouped as “Central” were strongly 
affected (this can be seen on Figure 4.2). “Donbass” is separated from “East Central” due to its 
particular history of heavy industrialization and strong identification with the Soviet Union. 
“Donbass” also experienced a stronger economic downturn than “East Central” around the time 
of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. “Crimea” is separated from “South” due to its special 







Table 4.1. A conceptual map of Ukraine with factors shaping democratic political culture 
 
                                               
48 Poltava is richer than the other oblasts in this category, but has the same low level of urbanization, and low proportion of Russians. 
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Table 4.1: This conceptual map of Ukraine summarizes the geographical distribution of factors that are expected to 
play a role in the shaping of people’s commitment to democratic values. 49 Basically, oblasts are placed in groups 
that share the same attributes. These groups are sorted according to their geographic location, and as we move from 
the top to the bottom of the table we also move (crudely) from the West to the East and South. The first column from 
the left shows the two different imperial legacies that an oblast can have. The second column shows the two inter-
war legacies that an oblast can have, and thus divides the oblasts with a Russian Imperial legacy into two groups, one 
with Polish inter-war legacy, and the other with Soviet inter-war legacy. The third column shows the demographic 
and economic profile of the oblasts (this is of course a crude approximation). The oblasts that end up in the same 
category after these three dicho-/trichotomizations are now grouped into regions according to their geographical 
clustering, and each of these regions are labeled with a name. The two last columns show individual variables. The 
second last column shows which religious groups can be found inside each regional category. (Only in Galicia can 
there be found two substantial religious groups). The last column shows the ethnolinguistic groups that are found 
inside each regional category and religious group. 
 
 
We can now draw a new map of Ukraine, Figure 4.11, with regions that correspond to the 
regional divisions that have been found through the conceptual map, Table 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.11    Map of Ukraine with regions obtained from the conceptual map 
 
Number of region Region 
1 Galicia 
2 Volhynia 








                                               
49 Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi are excluded from this conceptual map for the sake of clarity. We have already 








The three western regions Galicia (1), Volhynia (2) and West Central (3) are clustered around the 
former borders and will be central in our hypothesis testing. Table 4.2 summarizes the regime 
history for these regions and presents regime history also for the historical periods before the 
partitions of Poland-Lithuania and after the World War 2. This is done in order to point out that 
these three regions have the exact same regime history both before and after the imperial age and 
inter-war age. We have earlier shown that these three regions have had similar economic and 
demographic profiles (with except for religious and ethnolinguistic composition) since the time 
of the partitions of Poland, which make them well suited for comparison. We note that Galicia 
(1) and Volhynia (2) differ on only one historical variable – that of the imperial age - and that 
Volhynia (2) and West Central (3) also differ on only one historical variable – that of the inter-
war age. Galicia (1) and West Central (3) differ on both of these historical variables 
simultaneously. 
 
Table 4.2 Summary of regime history for three western regions50 









1795-WW1 Habsburg Empire Russian Empire Russian Empire 
WW2-WW2 Poland Poland Soviet Union 
WW2-1991 Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union 
1991-present Ukraine Ukraine Ukraine 
 
4.5 Discussion of earlier findings 
As we have seen, there is much evidence of historical legacies leading to regional differences in 
political culture in Ukraine. However, poor survey quality is often hindering precise assessments 
of these legacies and regional differences. A low level of geographic precision can make it 
                                               
50 As can be seen from Figure 4.1, a small part of Ternopil oblast, which is one of the three oblasts in the region of 
Galicia, belonged to the Russian Empire. Still, as much as 89 % of the present-day adult population of Ternopil lives 
on the territories of the former Habsburg Empire. This is calculated on the basis of information from Katchanovski 







difficult to find regional differences, and in any case makes it impossible to say exactly where 
regional boundaries can be found, and thus also what has caused their appearance. We also note 
by comparing Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.1 that the area with the highest proportion of Ukrainian 
speakers corresponds with the areas to the west of the former outer borders of the Soviet Union. 
From Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.1 we can see that the areas where Greek Catholics are in a 
majority (and indeed are making up a significant proportion of the population at all) correspond 
to the former Habsburg province of Galicia. As both of these demographic groups (Ukrainian-
speakers and Greek Catholics) have been theorized and found to be more committed to 
democratic values than others, we clearly have to consider if an eventual finding of a more 
democratic culture in Western Ukraine than in the rest of the country may have to do only with 
the overrepresentation of these particular demographic groups. 
 
Analyses based on surveys with a very low level of geographical precision do not find a more 
democratic culture in Western Ukraine than in other parts of Ukraine. Miller, White & Heywood 
(1998, 71) use a survey with samples from only some oblasts, and they combine the region that 
we have defined as Volhynia with Lviv oblast in Galicia, and call this “Western Ukraine”. Their 
region of “Western Ukraine” thus includes oblasts which differ on a crucial legacy-variable, as 
can be seen in Table 4.1. Their definition of “Eastern Ukraine” equals our Donbass plus East 
Central, while “Central Ukraine” includes all remaining regions. As we can understand from 
Table 4.1, their three regions thus comprise oblasts which differ on several variables 
simultaneously, and by comparing these regions they thus do not manage to isolate any specific 
historical legacy variable (nor any other regional variables). We find basically the same problem 
in Miller, Klobucar & Reisinger’s (2000) analysis, where Ukraine is divided into two equally 
large halves, which thus also comprises oblasts that differ on several variables simultaneously.51 
Shulman (2005), who uses a five-region framework, also has this problem.52 
                                               
51 In their framework “Western Ukraine” consists of Galicia, Volhynia, West Central, Kiev and Southwest, while 
“Eastern Ukraine” basically consists of Central, East Central, Donbass, Crimea and South (Miller, Klobucar & 
Reisinger 2000, 216). From Table 4.1 we can see that inside their “Western Ukraine” are included oblasts with all 
possible regime histories and combinations. It would thus in reality be impossible to say anything about historical 
legacies based on the results of their analysis. 
52 Shulman (2005, 73) uses a survey with samples from only some oblasts. Included in his “Western Ukraine” are 
oblasts from our Galicia, Volhynia and Southwest regions. “Central Ukraine” comprises Kiev oblast, Vinnytsia 
oblast and Poltava oblast in his framework, and “Southeast” includes Dontesk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa. 








The three newer studies are better, but there are problems attached also to these. Person (2010) is 
explicitly investigating historical legacies in the former Habsburg province of Galicia, but he 
merges all other oblasts than the three oblasts of Galicia into one macro region and compares 
Galicia with this (2010, 145-154, 158-160). Person does find that residence in Galicia leads to a 
higher level of commitment to democratic values as compared to residence in the rest of Ukraine, 
but as we understand from Table 4.1, he does not obtain any control at all for other regional 
variables as all non-Galician oblasts are merged together in one macro-region. We therefore 
cannot tell from Person’s findings if Galicia is actually different also from its nearest neighbors 
on the other sides of the former borders, or if the positive finding is driven only for example by 
some oblasts in the far East which are creating a big overall difference between Galicia and the 
non-Galician macro region. ICDT (2015) also finds that residence in Western Ukraine increase 
one’s commitment to democratic values. However, their “Western Ukraine” includes all the areas 
that did not belong to the Soviet Union before World War 2 (Belanenko 2018, personal 
communication in email), which corresponds to Galicia, Volhynia and Southwest in our 
framework. ICDT (2015, 41) uses Kiev as baseline comparison region, and as we can see from 
Table 4.1, Kiev is different from the western regions on several variables. When ICDT find an 
effect of residence in “Western Ukraine” we thus cannot know what causes this. Katchanovski 
(2018) is using the same definition of Western Ukraine as ICDT, but he does not find a 
particularly high level of democratic culture there as compared to other regions. It is unclear how 
“Central Ukraine”, “Eastern Ukraine” and “Southern Ukraine” are defined in his article, but since 
he informs that “Western Ukraine” is defined as Galica, Volhynia and Southwest it would 
anyway have been impossible to tell which historical legacies that had accounted for eventual 
differences in democratic culture between the regions. Katchanovski does, however, find a higher 
level of commitment to democratic values among the Greek-Catholic population, which is highly 
concentrated in Galica. 
 
We now understand that in order to isolate the historical legacy-variables, we have to be very 
careful with which regions to compare. In Table 4.2 we have shown the three regions which are 








We will now formulate three hypotheses. As we have outlined in this chapter, we have reasons to 
believe that there is a particularly high level of democratic political culture in certain areas due to 
historical legacies. We are in other words expecting that historical legacy relationships are 
operating in such a way that people who live in certain areas are more committed to democratic 
values than people who live in other areas. If we can confirm - when controlled for other effects - 
that there is an effect on people’s commitment to democratic values from living in an area that 
was ruled by a particular empire or state, we can therefore also infer that there is a historical 
legacy relationship operating. Further, if there is such a thing as an Eastern European threshold in 
democratic culture as was discussed in Chapter 3.2.2.1, we should expect that the regions to the 
east of this threshold have a lower level of democratic culture than the areas to the west of it.  
 
Our first two hypotheses are therefore concerning the effect on commitment to democratic values 
from living in certain regions. The third hypothesis is concerning the level of democratic culture, 
which will be measured as the average level of commitment to democratic values within a 
population, and will serve as a point of departure for discussing the strength of other contextual 
effects that influence people’s commitment to democratic values in Ukraine. 
 
Based on the theory and findings we have presented about historical legacies of imperial rule we 
can formulate the following hypothesis: 
H1: To live in Galicia has a positive effect on commitment to democratic values as 
compared to living in Volhynia. 
The former border between the Habsburg Empire and the Russian empire runs through an area 
that is otherwise very homogenous, where Galicia is located on the former Habsburg side of the 
border, and Volhynia is located on the former Russian side. Thus, if we can confirm that there is 
a positive effect on commitment to democratic values from living in Galicia as compared to 
Volhynia, then we will have reason to believe that the developments leading up to this effect 
originate in the period when different empires ruled on each side of the border. This will, 
according to Beissinger & Kotkin’s definition (2014, 7), amount to a legacy relationship between 







that H1 is supported, we will thus also establish that a legacy of Habsburg imperial rule is a more 
democratic political culture than that of Russian Imperial rule. 
 
Based on the theory and findings we have presented about Greek Catholics, and since Greek 
Catholics are overrepresented in the former Habsburg province of Galicia, we can formulate the 
following rival hypothesis: 
H1a: A higher average level of commitment to democratic values in Galicia than in 
Volhynia is explained by Galicia’s population of Greek Catholics, who are more 
committed to democratic values than others. 
 
The null hypothesis is: 
H1null: There is no difference in people’s commitment to democratic values between 
Galicia and Volhynia.  
 
Based on the theory and findings we have presented about historical legacies from the inter-war 
period we can formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2: To live in Volhynia has a positive effect on commitment to democratic values as 
compared to living in West Central. 
 
The former border between Poland and the Soviet Union runs through an area that is otherwise 
very homogenous, and where Volhynia is located on the former Polish side of the border, and 
where West Central is located on the former Soviet Union side. Thus, if we can confirm that there 
is a positive effect on commitment to democratic values from living in Volhynia as compared to 
West Central, then we will have reason to believe that the developments leading up to this effect 
originate in the period when different states ruled on each side of the border. This will, according 
to Beissinger & Kotkin’s definition (2014, 7), amount to a legacy relationship between 
developments in the inter-war age and present-day commitment to democratic values. If we find 
that H2 is supported, we will thus also establish that a legacy of inter-war rule by Poland is a 








Based on the theory and findings we have presented about Ukraine’s ethnolinguistic cleavages, 
and since Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians are overrepresented in Volhynia, we can formulate the 
following rival hypothesis: 
H2a: A higher average level of commitment to democratic values in Volhynia than in 
West Central is explained by Volhynia’s population of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, 
who are more committed to democratic values than others. 
 
The null hypothesis is: 
H2null: There is no difference in people’s commitment to democratic values between 
Volhynia and West Central. 
 
Based on theory, findings and suggestions about a particularly high level of democratic culture in 
the former Habsburg province of Galicia as compared to all other regions, we can formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
H3: Galicia has a higher average level of commitment to democratic values than all 
regions that belonged to the Russian Empire. 
 
As we understand, H3 is not concerning the effect of living on the western side of the former 
border between the Habsburg province of Galicia and the Russian Empire. Galicia and the 
regions of the former Russian Empire are different on more than one variable simultaneously, and 
we can therefore not isolate specific effects in the way we that we can in the border area. H3 
therefore concerns the average level of commitment to democratic culture in Galicia as compared 
to all other regions, when not controlling for other variables. Through H3 we will thus compare 
the strength of the historical legacy relationship with all other possible pathways to a democratic 
political culture that can be found in the eastern regions of Ukraine. Even if H1 is confirmed, it is 
possible that regions further east have an equally high or higher level of democratic political 
culture than Galicia. If so, we must conclude that there are other pathways to a high level of 
democratic political culture than that of historical legacies.53 Based on theory about development 
of democratic political culture we would expect the economically most highly developed regions 
                                               
53 As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the available surveys put limits on what we can investigate. Better surveys 







to be most able to compete with Galicia in terms of level of democratic culture. As can be seen in 
Table 4.1, the economically most highly developed regions are Kiev, East Central and Donbass. 
Among these we will expect Kiev and East Central to have a high level of democratic culture, 
while Donbass (As discussed in Chapter 4.2.1) for other reasons is expected to have a low level 
of democratic culture. 
 
The null hypothesis is: 
H3null: Galicia does not have a higher average level of commitment to democratic values 
than all regions that belonged to the Russian Empire. 
 
We will now go on with explaining how we will measure commitment to democratic values, and 
how we will conduct the statistical analysis. 
5. Data and method 
5.1 Introduction 
Ukraine has been called a “natural experiment” (Peisakhin 2015, Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017) 
due to the historical circumstances that made borders between empires and states divide an 
otherwise very homogenous population. Fuchs (1999, 123) comments that the German case, 
where a country was divided in two parts and underlaid different political regimes for around 50 
years, almost perfectly conforms to Przeworski & Teune’s (1970) “most similar systems design”, 
where the basic idea is to compare systems that are as similar as possible except for on the 
dependent variable and on one independent variable. What Fuchs said was the case for Germany 
also seems to be the case for parts of Ukraine, and our research design will be constructed in 
order to exploit this. We have found two surveys that are suited for this purpose, one of which is 
conducted before, and the other conducted after the Euromaidan, annexation of Crimea, and 
almost four years into the war in Donbass. Two surveys will yield more validity than just one, 
and by employing both of these surveys for testing our hypotheses we will also be sure that the 
patterns of democratic political culture that we find are not created by, nor erased by, the events 








We will in the following subchapters explain why these surveys are suited for our purpose, and 
look at the possibilities they give and limitations they put on what we can study. Further, we will 
explain how we create an index of commitment to democratic values and explain how and why 
we will conduct an OLS-regression with regional dummy variables. 
5.2 Surveys 
A thorough review of available surveys of Ukraine has been done before concluding on which 
surveys are best suited for our purpose. The most fruitful search was done in the online database 
of Kyyivsʹkyy Mizhnarodnyy Instytut Sotsiolohiyi [Kiev International Institute of Sociology] 
(KIIS). In their database Kyyivsʹkyy arkhiv (“Kyivan archive”) more than 200 surveys conducted 
by Ukrainian survey institutes between 1991 and 2017 are stored (KIIS n. d.). Kyyivs’kyy arkhiv 
was where we eventually discovered one of the surveys that we ended up using, namely KIIS 
Omnibus 2007/10 (from now on: Omnibus 2007), conducted by KIIS in 2007 (KIIS 2007a). The 
other survey that we will use, KIIS Omnibus 2018/02 (from now on: Omnibus 2018) was 
conducted by KIIS in 2018. By request from this author, and with financial support from the 
University of Bergen, the questions that were most relevant to us in Omnibus 2007 were included 
again in Omnibus 2018.54 
 
In the process of searching for surveys we have been looking specifically for surveys that fulfill 
certain criteria: They must be surveys of the population of Ukraine that include relevant questions 
for our investigation of democratic political culture, and they also need to include relevant 
background questions about the respondents, particularly questions related to language, ethnicity 
and religion. Further, and importantly, as our goal is to compare inhabitants of different regions 
of Ukraine, the surveys have to be representative also for relevant regions of the country, and as a 
consequence of this the number of respondents of the countrywide survey must be reasonably 
high. 
 
                                               
54 Omnibus 2018 has of 30th May 2018 not been made public and was received by this author in email from Eugene 
Ilenko at KIIS together with survey methodology paper. All Omnibus surveys with methodology papers and 







It appears that we are facing a dilemma, since we will have to choose between datasets that give 
us a high level of conceptual precision (datasets that include many questions that are highly 
relevant when studying the spread of democratic values), or a dataset that gives us a high level of 
geographical precision (datasets that are representative for a low regional level. This will be 
better explained below.) As discussed earlier, what is lacking in the literature is a geographically 
highly precise analysis. In order to be able to conduct such a geographically precise analysis we 
have prioritized the geographical aspect of survey quality. 
5.2.1 Representativeness at sub-national levels 
The choice of survey method is often a question about high precision versus cost-efficiency. A 
compromise between these two considerations needs to be found, and in most Ukrainian surveys 
this means that the method which is used is a variant of stratified multistage cluster sampling. 
Forms of multistage sampling are widely used in surveys of large geographical areas (Daniel 
2012, 153). We will now see how the different aspects of this sampling method affect the random 
sampling error, and what the consequences of this are for us. 
 
One way to make sure that relevant subgroups of a population are represented in a sample is to 
divide the population into a number of strata that coincide with these subgroups, and then draw a 
sample from each of these strata. As compared to simple random sampling without stratification, 
this technique reduces the overall random sampling error, since we are guaranteed a number of 
respondents from all strata (2012, 138-139). Stratification is often used when the aim is to obtain 
nationally representative samples, but also - and more important to us - when the aim is to 
compare different strata of the same category with each other (2012, 131-133). Even though the 
surveys that we use have national representativeness as their primary aim, this latter point will be 
exploited by us. 
 
In most surveys of Ukraine, the country is divided into a number of regional strata, which are 
again divided into “type of settlement”-strata. The Omnibus 2007 and Omnibus 2018 have 
samples that are stratified according to all oblasts, and also according to type of settlement inside 







oblasts,55 while in 2018 stratification is done according to 24 oblasts.56,57 As will now be 
explained, this gives us an opportunity for a fine grained analysis with regards to regional effects. 
 
Sampling is done inside each stratum - and in most cases this is done so that the final national 
sample includes correct proportions of respondents from each of the regional strata, as well as 
correct proportions of respondents from the different types of settlement inside each regional 
stratum. In most of the Ukrainian surveys “type of settlement” means urban versus rural 
residence, or in some cases also a further division of urban residence into small towns versus 
large cities. If commitment to democratic values is dependent on specific demographic 
characteristics we need to be sure that samples from the regions that we compare are made in 
such a way they reflect the true distribution of the relevant demographic groups in these regions. 
Urban or rural residence is found to be an important determinant of political culture in former 
communist countries (as well as globally). This makes type of settlement an important 
demographic characteristic in itself, and in addition to this we have already mentioned that 
several other demographic characteristics are unequally distributed between urban and rural types 
of settlements in Ukraine. This includes ethnic and linguistic groups specifically in the Ukrainian 
case, and generally also age, gender, education and income groups can be unequally distributed 
between urban and rural areas. Thus, by making sure that sampling is done both in urban and 
rural regions of each regional stratum, one will obtain samples that are closer to the real 
distribution of these demographic characteristics.58 We will now turn to the more problematic 
side of the multistage survey methods. 
 
                                               
55 This is confirmed by Yulia Sakhno (2017, personal communication in email). Unfortunately, no detailed paper 
about survey methodology is available specifically for Omnibus 2007, but Sakhno (2017, personal communication in 
email) confirms that all Omnibus surveys are conducted using the same sampling methods, and that the paper about 
survey methodology which is available for Omnibus KIIS 2015/12 (KIIS 2015) is valid also for Omnibus 2007. 
56 In Omnibus 2018 sampling is not done at all on Crimea, and in Donetsk oblast and Luhansk oblast only in the 
areas that are under control of the Ukrainian authorities.  
57 Two surveys of Ukraine with good regional representation are the ones conducted by the project “Region Nation 
and Beyond”, available at University of St. Gallen’s webpage “Region nation and beyond” (2017) but these are 
lacking good questions about democratic values. 
58 Minor to medium deviations from the real distribution of demographic groups may also be adjusted through the 







All relevant surveys from Ukraine are done by an interviewer face-to-face.59 Interviewers need to 
visit households in person, and the time usage and cost of conducting a survey will therefore be 
reduced if respondents are geographically concentrated. As we will see, this comes at the cost of 
higher random sampling error. 
 
In most of the relevant surveys a four-stage procedure is followed after a decision has been made 
on which geographical regions and types of settlement should be used as strata. The first step is 
to randomly draw a number of sampling points, for example a number of postal districts, inside 
each stratum. These sampling points are what we call primary sampling units (PSU) (Daniel 
2012, 153-154). The second step is to draw a number of districts inside each PSU, which thus 
become secondary sampling units (SSU), and in some cases districts are also drawn inside the 
SSUs as tertiary sampling units (TSU). The third step is then to draw an address of the first 
household that is to be visited by the interviewer, and the fourth step is to draw a route to be 
followed to other households inside the SSU or TSU. This is the technique used by KIIS in the 
Omnibus surveys, which they call four stage random sampling (KIIS 2015). This sampling 
method can be placed in the category that Daniel (2012, 153) calls multistage cluster sampling.60 
What is of relevance to us is to understand how multistage cluster sampling leads to larger 
random sampling errors than simple random sampling does, and what the consequences of this is 
with regards to regional representativeness of the surveys. 
 
Ideally, in order to obtain representative samples from all strata, simple random sampling should 
be done inside each stratum. When this is done, the overall random sampling error of the survey 
becomes lower than what it would have been if simple random sampling was done without 
stratification (2012, 162). This would also be the ideal situation when the goal is to compare 
different strata of the same category (2012, 131-133). When simple random sampling is not an 
option, and sampling inside the strata is done by use of sampling units, one would want the 
within-sampling unit differences to be as large as possible in order to capture the whole range of 
                                               
59 None are done through telephone. Generally, face-to-face interviews are preferred because it gives higher response 
rates and a better possibility to control which member of a household who answers the questions (Daniel 2012 40, 
48).  
60 When KIIS uses the word “random” it is probably in order to point out that drawing is done randomly in every 
step, so that every respondent has the same probability of being drawn. Daniels’ emphasis is on the effects of the 







values on the variables of interest which exist inside each stratum (2012, 162). The closer the 
sampling units resemble the stratum as a whole the less information is lost when sampling is done 
from the sampling units instead of simple random sampling inside the stratum.  
 
In the Omnibus surveys a PSU is a whole city or town in the urban strata, and a rayon 
(municipality) in the rural strata. SSUs are districts inside cities and towns in the urban strata and 
villages in the rural strata. In the urban strata samples are drawn from these SSUs, while in rural 
strata one further step is taken as samples are drawn from TSUs in the form of village districts 
(KIIS 2015). This means that there is a problem attached to these surveys, as to all other surveys 
that use geographic clusters, namely that the smaller geographical areas the sampling units cover, 
the more homogenous the sampling units tend to become (Daniel 2012, 153-154). This form of 
multistage cluster sampling, in other words, are producing samples with lower strata-wise 
representativeness and higher random sampling errors than would be the case if simple random 
sampling was done inside the strata (2012, 160). 
  
Calculation of sampling error is more complicated for multistage cluster samples than for simple 
random samples, and special methods should therefore ideally be used when analyzing multistage 
cluster samples. This is not always taken into consideration when regression analyses are 
conducted, with the result of biased standard errors and overestimated significance levels (2012, 
160). In our case there are no variables in the datasets that indicate PSUs, SSUs or TSUs, and we 
are thus confined to conduct the regression analysis as if we are dealing with a simple random 
sample. This must be taken into consideration when assessing the results from our analysis, and 
as we will now see, it also has consequences for the way in which we can conduct our analysis. 
 
If the sampling units are internally homogenous but not representative for the overall stratum, it 
follows that a way of increasing the representativeness and reducing the random sampling error 
of a multistage cluster sample is to increase the number of sampling units (2012, 160). In the 
Omnibus surveys there are in total 110 sampling points, which means that there are on average 
slightly more than two sampling points from the rural areas and two sampling points from the 
urban areas of each of the 24/25 oblasts. With such a low number of sampling units the samples 
from the individual oblasts have a low level of representativeness, and the surveys are not well 







can be dealt with elegantly. As we have seen in Table 1, there are groups of oblasts that are 
similar on both historical and other variables. By merging together oblasts that are known to be 
similar on variables of interest we obtain more or less homogenous macro-regions with a higher 
number of sampling points. The representativeness of these macro-regions thus becomes higher 
than for the individual oblasts. Other surveys than those conducted by KIIS are not stratified 
according to all oblasts but are instead stratified for groups of oblasts consisting of between four 
and 12 oblasts. If these regional strata had been equivalent to the regions that we want to 
compare, we could just as well have used one of these surveys as the Omnibus surveys. The 
problem is that regional strata in the surveys are not equivalent to the regions that we want to 
compare, and we would thus have had to divide regional strata in order to obtain samples from 
the regions that we want to compare. This would have been a problematic thing to do. If we 
create macro-regions completely independent of the regional strata, we do not know how 
representative these macro-regions are. For example, if we create a macro-region by merging half 
of one regional stratum with a third of another regional stratum, we may end up with a macro-
region that has a very unbalanced sample in terms of type of settlement (and thus possibly also 
other demographic characteristics), that has a very uneven distribution of sampling points, that 
has few sampling points, or that has a very small sample. These problems will be particularly 
large if a sample has only a few, large regional strata from which a low number of sampling 
points are drawn. The surveys with a low number of stratified regions could be used only if 
detailed information about the geographical location of all sampling points were provided, and if 
these sampling points by chance happened to be placed in such a way that we ended up with 
macro-regions that are representative of the population. In the end the Omnibus surveys therefore 
give us the highest level of control of the representativeness of the regions that we are interested 
in comparing. Omnibus 2007 (N=2032) and Omnibus 2018 (N=2043) are also among the 
available surveys that have the highest number of respondents. Still, this means that the number 
of respondents from each oblast is relatively low,61 which is another reason why these surveys are 
not suited for studying individual oblasts. 
                                               







5.2.2 Questions included in the survey 
In Chapter 3 we discussed two different approaches for measuring democratic culture. The 
Omnibus surveys include questions that allow us to study democratic political culture according 
to a narrow approach that focuses on commitment to basic democratic values. The number of 
relevant questions for measuring political culture is lower here than in some of the other surveys, 
but if we want to conduct a geographically precise analysis, this is our best choice. The questions 
included in the Omnibus surveys are:62 
 
“There are different views on what social and political conditions are required for life in this 
country to be good. How important are the following conditions in this regard? 
 
1. The right to speak freely about everything, even if it creates tension in society 
2. The possibility to print newspapers of every political orientation 
3. Freedom to join political parties that can compete in elections 
 
1- Not at all important 
2- Not very important 
3- Difficult to say if it is important or not important 
4- Important, but not obligatory 
5- Obligatory 
 “ 
These are all questions that directly pertain to basic liberal democratic rights and liberties as 
understood from Dahl (1971, 1989), and are thus valid as measures of peoples’ commitment to 
democratic values. 
 
                                               
62 Omnibus 2007 includes questionnaires and datasets in Russian and Ukrainian. Translations into English are done 
by this author on the basis of the Russian version. The same questions that were included in Omnibus 2007 were 
again included in Omnibus 2018 by request from this author, and with financial support from the University of 
Bergen. KIIS then asked this author to translate these questions from Russian into English in order for them to make 
a dataset in English. Thus, there exist an English version of the Omnibus 2018 dataset, and the wording of the 
questions in that dataset is a product of this author’s translation from Russian. This translation is not necessarily very 
accurate. In the present subchapter the questions are presented as written in the Omnibus 2018 dataset, but some 
notes on the translation should be made: The word “obligatory” is a translation of the Russion word обязательно, 
and a better translation in this context would probably have been “necessary” or “very important”. See Appendix for 







In a situation like this, when we have several questions measuring different aspects of the same 
concept, a possible next step is to merge the questions together to a composite measure that can 
be seen as an overall measurement of the concept. Composite measures like this have been used 
for measurement of democratic political culture by, among others, Fuchs & Roller (1994), Fuchs 
& Klingemann (2006), Katchanovski (2018) and Pop-Eleches & Tucker (2017).  
5.3 Constructing a composite measure 
5.3.1 Concept and measurement 
The answers to the questions on our surveys are given in terms of how important rights and 
freedoms are for the respondent, which is coded to a 5-point scale. This is in other words a 5-
point ordinal variable and is what we can call a Likert-type item (Gliem & Gliem 2003). To 
analyze ordinal variables as if they were metric has often been criticized and should not be done 
if they have less than 6-7 values (Midtbø 2016, 35). However, when one has several 5-point items 
which are measuring the same concept, the most beneficial way of analyzing them is, according 
to Gliem & Gliem (2003), to add them together to a summated multi-item scale (what we will 
call a composite measure), which can then be treated as a continuous scale. If this is to be done, it 
must be shown, both theoretically and empirically, that the items are actually measuring the same 
concept. If this can be shown, it will be beneficial to make a composite measure. A single item 
has considerable random measurement error, and if several items that are measuring the same 
concept are added together, much of this random error will average out. Further, even though the 
items should measure the same concept, more than one item may be needed in order to represent 
various aspects of this concept (Gliem & Gliem 2003, 83; Hair et al. 2014, 122). Goertz (2006, 
103) is stressing the need for the measure structure of a concept to comply with the theoretical 
structure of the concept. If the theoretical structure of a concept requires several elements to be 
present, then the measurement of the concept should not simply be the added sum of the elements 
which are actually present. In our case, “commitment to democratic values” refers to a general 
commitment to democratic values (and not just support for some of Dahls rights and liberties). 
Thus, a person’s degree of commitment to democratic values should, if the concept really exists, 
be reflected in a similar degree of commitment to various individual democratic values. In other 







respondents are answering the three questions in the surveys. If we find that there is such a 
consistency, then we know that the three questions are actually measuring the same latent 
concept. And further, we will then also know that it is meaningful to speak about the concept of 
“commitment to democratic values” in the Ukrainian context. The way to go ahead to find out if 
the three questions are measuring the same latent concept is to investigate the composite 
measure’s dimensionality and internal consistency (Hair et al. 2014, 123; Robinson, Shaver & 
Wrightsman 1991, 10-11). 
5.3.2 Dimensionality 
When we test the dimensionality of a set of variables we analyze the structure of the 
interrelatedness of the variables in order to find out if there are groups of variables which can be 
grouped together as measures of the same concept (Hair et al. 2014, 92). In the context of survey 
analysis this means that we will be analyzing how the answers people give to different questions 
are interrelated, and in this way try to find out if there are groups of questions which can be seen 
as measures of the same underlying concept. A group of variables that correlate with the same 
underlying concept can be said to be unidimensional. In our case we want to find out if the 
questions that we presented in Chapter 5.2.2 are unidimensional and thus measures of the same 
underlying concept. Assessment of the dimensionality of a set of variables can be done either 
through exploratory or confirmatory factor analysis (2014, 123). We will here proceed by 
conducting a form of exploratory factor analysis.63  
 
The first step before starting with the factor analysis itself is to check that there is sufficient 
correlation between the variables so that it is possible to make a proper estimation of the 
underlying structure of the variables (Hair et al. 2014, 102-103).64 We then face a choice between 
common factor analysis and component analysis.65 We follow Costello & Osbourne’s (2005, 1-2) 
recommendation, and do not conduct a principal component analysis, which they regard as an 
                                               
63Confirmatory factor analysis is well suited for testing of hypotheses about relationships between groups of 
variables and underlying concepts but can not be conducted for a single group of less than four variables due to a 
lack of degrees of freedom (Hair et al. 2014, 670). In our case we have a single composite measure consisting of only 
three variables. 
64 This was done in the form of a Bartlett test of sphericity as well as a measurement of sampling adequacy, as 
recommended by Hair et al. (2014, 102-103). These tests confirmed a sufficient correlation between the variables. 







outdated and “untrue” form of factor analysis which can yield inflated results. We rather follow 
their advice of conducting a form of common exploratory factor analysis, which analyses the 
underlying structure of the variables on the basis only of their shared variance (Hair et al. 2014, 
105). We end up with doing an iterated principal-factor analysis, which gives better estimates 
than a simple factor analysis (Stata 2018a, 9). In this form of analysis, one should first run one 
analysis where one decides how many factors to retain, and then rerun the analysis. On the basis 
of the second analysis the factor loadings of the variables are assessed (Stata 2018a, 9-10). 
 
We will start by noting that the LR-tests of independence versus the saturated models in Table 
5.1 and Table 5.3 yield significant results, in effect confirming a high correlation between the 
variables. This is needed for a factor analysis to be meaningful (Stata 2018a, 11). The next step is 
to analyze the results in order to find out how many dimensions that are represented by the 
factors, or in other words find out how many factors should be retained in order to properly 
represent the shared variance of the three variables. Three common ways of deciding this on the 
basis of a factor analysis are the latent root criterion, the percentage of explained variance 
criterion and the scree test (Hair et al. 2014, 107-109). The most commonly used is the latent 
root criterion, which says that all factors that are retained should represent at least a whole 
variable, meaning that they should have eigenvalues above 1.66 From Table 5.1 and Table 5.3 we 
can see that in both cases only Factor 1 meets this criterion. This is in other words an indication 
that our three questions are indeed measurements of a single underlying concept. A strict criterion 
for the percentage of explained variance is that factors should be retained until 95 % of the 
common variance is extracted. In social science this cut-off value is sometimes set as low as 60 
% (2014, 118). In Table 5.1 and Table 5.3 we can see that Factor 1 alone extracts more than 95 
% of the variance. The scree test involves a visual inspection of the eigenvalues with the aim to 
find the point at which there ceases to be large gaps in the eigenvalues between subsequent 
factors, and the factors that appears before the last gap should be retained Costello & Osborne 
(2005, 3). In Table 5.1 and Table 5.3 we can see that there is a large difference in the eigenvalues 
between Factor 1 and Factor 2, and a comparably very small difference between Factor 2 and 
Factor 3. In sum these tests indicate that there are strong reasons for seeing the three variables as 
                                               
66 The latent root criterion is most reliable when the number of variables is above 20 (Hair et al. 2014, 107), which is 







being properly represented by one factor alone in both surveys, meaning that the groups of three 
variables seem to be unidimensional. 
 
The factor loadings in Table 5.2 and Table 5.4 show the correlations between the first factor and 
the individual variables. The proportion of the variance of a variable that is explained by the first 
factor equals the square of the factor loading (Hair et al. 2014, 114), and the proportion of 
variance of a variable that is not explained by the first factor is what we call uniqueness (Stata 
2018a, 7). There is no benchmark value that definitely decides if a variable has a sufficiently high 
factor loading, but Hair et al. (2014, 115-116) holds that factor loadings should be above 0,50. 
Others consider a uniqueness above 0,6 as “high” (which is equivalent to regarding factor 
loadings below 0,63 as “low”) (Stata 2018a, 7). The uniqueness of a variable may be due to 
random sampling errors, and one of the benefits of adding together variables to form a composite 
measure is, as we have seen, precisely to equal out random sampling errors. But a high 
uniqueness can also indicate that the variable is measuring another concept than the one which is 
intended (Stata 2018a, 7). We can see from Table 5.2 and Table 5.4 that variable 1 and 3 in 
Omnibus 2007 and variable 1 in Omnibus 2018 have a uniqueness of more than 0,6. This 
indicates that especially in Omnibus 2007 there is a discrepancy between the concept that we 
want to measure and what we are really measuring when we add together the variables to a 
composite measure.67 We should, however, also have in mind that one of the points of making a 
composite measure is that the concept that one wants to measure can not be measured directly, 
and that we have to measure different aspects of the concept separately. We are thus expecting a 
certain level of uniqueness also due to the fact that the different aspects of the concept are not 
equal and therefore should not be expected to vary completely equally. But this is not to explain 
away the fact that some of our variables have a higher level of uniqueness than we would have 
appreciated.68 When we come to the regression analyses in Chapter 6 we will utilize subsamples 
                                               
67 Because of this we have conducted separate ordinal logistic regressions for each of the variables individually in 
addition to the analysis that is presented here. These separate regressions generally show no large deviations from the 
overall pattern found in the analysis part of this thesis. 
68 Since the latent concept found in a factor analysis is a linear combination of the variables, the variables can be 
weighed according to the proportion of variance they share with the latent concept. In this way the latent concept will 
be represented in the most precise way (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 2008, 31-32). 
We have done this and found out that the difference in uniqueness between the different variables is so low that the 
results we get in the regression analyses when we weigh and when we do not weigh the variables hardly differ at all. 







from each of the surveys in addition to the full samples. We have therefore done factor analysis 
for the subsamples as well. These can be found in the Appendix (A1-A4), and generally show the 
same patterns as the full samples, although the subsample from Omnibus 2007 shows slightly 
weaker signs of unidimensionality, and the subsample from Omnibus 2018 shows slightly 
stronger signs of unidimensionality than the full samples. 
 
Table 5.1.  Omnibus 2007 Factor analysis part 1      
Factor Eigenvalue Proportion 
Factor 1 1,18619 0,9521 
Factor 2 0,05987 0,0481 
Factor 3 -0,00016 -0,0001 
N=1863 
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  =  750.65 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 
Table 5.2. Omnibus 2007 Factor analysis part 2 
Variable Factor loading Uniqueness 
1 0,5486 0,6990 
2 0,7834 0,3862 
3 0,5194 0,7302 
 
Table 5.3. Omnibus 2018 Factor analysis part 1      
Factor Eigenvalue Proportion 
Factor 1 1,62940 0,9691 
Factor 2 0,05208 0,0310 
Factor 3 -0,00011 -0,0001 
N=1961     




Table 5.4. Omnibus 2018 Factor analysis part 2 
Variable Factor loading Uniqueness 
1 0,5975 0,6430 
2 0,8790 0,2274 
3 0,7016 0,5078 
 
Before we proceed we should sum up what we can learn about Ukraine’s political culture and the 







variables is explained by the same latent concept; the concept that we have decided to call 
democratic political culture. This indicates that there does exist such a phenomenon as 
democratic political culture in Ukraine, and that we are measuring it in a reasonable way. The 
somewhat low factor loadings on some of the variables may indicate that there are better ways to 
measure this concept, but it can also mean that the political culture in Ukraine has an element of 
fragmentation and inconsistency. We should therefore go back to the questions from the two 
surveys, and look at which questions that are least explained by the common factor. Question 
number 1, which can be seen as a question about the respondents’ view on freedom of 
expression, has a comparatively low factor loading in both surveys. What makes this question 
different from the other two questions is that it includes a contingency (“even if it creates tension 
in society”), which the other two questions do not include. We may speculate that this has made 
the responses to question number 1 diverge a bit more from the responses to the other two 
questions than would have been the case had this contingency not been included. Question 
number 2, which can be seen as a question about press freedom is strongly associated with the 
latent concept in both surveys, although stronger in the 2018 survey. Question number 3 about 
the right to join parties and that can participate in elections was the question that was weakest 
associated with the latent concept in 2007, but this association is much stronger in 2018. The 
general rise in factor loadings, which is visible for all variables, might be an indication of a rising 
consistency in the political culture of Ukraine. However, and even though the two surveys are 
conducted by the same bureau and the same survey methodology, the differences that are 
observed between the two surveys might be an indication that Omnibus 2018 is of higher quality 
than Omnibus 2007. 
5.3.3 Internal consistency 
In the last subchapter we tested the relationship between the variables and a common latent 
concept; what we will do now is to test the interrelationship between the variables themselves. If 
there is really such a phenomenon as democratic culture, and if we are measuring this 
phenomenon correctly, there should be a correlation between the different measures that we use 








As a first step we will have a look at the correlation matrices for the variables and the index 
consisting of the sum of the three other variables. Hair et al. (2014, 123) suggest 0,3 as 
benchmark for inter-item correlations (in the context of composite measures individual variables 
are commonly called items), and in addition to this, item-index correlations should be no less than 
0,5. Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsman (1991, 13) are less strict and see an average-inter item 
correlation of a survey of 0,3 as “exemplary”, while average values down to 0,1 would pass by a 
moderate criterion. At a minimum, all pairwise correlation of items included in a composite 
measure need to be significant at a 5 % level (1991, 7). As can be seen from Table 5.5 and Table 
5.6, all individual inter-item correlations pass by the 0,3-criterion except for the correlation 
between variable number 1 and variable number 3 in Omnibus 2007,69 which is slightly in 
violation of this criterion (while still being strongly significant). Both surveys clearly pass the 
0,3-criterion for average inter-item correlation, and all item-index correlations are above the 
benchmark value of 0,5. Again, the equivalent tables for the subsamples that we are going to use 
are included in the Appendix (A5-A6). These show very similar patterns as Table 5.5 and Table 
5.6. 
 
Table 5.5  Inter-item and item-index correlations for Omnibus 2007 
Item 1 2 3 Index 
1 1,000    
2 0,4331*** 1,000   
3 0,2846*** 0,4101*** 1,000  
Index 0,7494*** 0,8059*** 0,7345*** 1,000 
***=p-value less than 0,0001 
 
Table 5.6  Inter-item and item-index correlations for Omnibus 2018 
Item 1 2 3 Index 
1 1,000    
2 0,5231*** 1,000   
3 0,4199*** 0,6163*** 1,000  
Index 0,7847*** 0,8678*** 0,8217*** 1,000 
***=p-value less than 0,0001 
 
                                               
69One of the involved variables is variable number 1, and a reason for why this variable might diverge from the other 
two variables has been commented on earlier. When it is only variable number 1’s correlation with variable number 
3 that is below the benchmark, this might have to do with question 1 being less associated with question number 3 








A much used overall measure of the internal consistency of composite measures is Cronbach’s 
alpha. A high Cronbach’s alpha value indicates that there is a high degree of interrelatedness 
among its composite items, and thus that they have a low level of uniqueness (Cortina 1993, 
100). Importantly, however, is that Cronbach’s alpha is not only a function of the interrelatedness 
of the composite items, but also of the number of items. If two different indexes have the same 
inter-item correlations, an index consisting of a higher number of items will yield a higher (in 
many cases much higher) Cronbach’s alpha than an index consisting of a lower number of items 
(1993, 101). A commonly accepted threshold value of Cronbach’s alpha is 0,7 (stemming 
originally from Nunnally (1978)), but according to Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsman (1991, 13) 
Cronbach’s alpha values of 0,6 can pass by a moderate criterium of internal consistency. 
However, to choose a general threshold value like this regardless of the number of items in the 
composite measure would be meaningless, according to Cortina (1993) and Schmitt (1996). One 
should therefore take into account the number of composite items when deciding whether a given 
Cronbach’s alpha is acceptable or not. In our case we have an index consisting of only three 
variables, and we can thus expect to be in the lower end of acceptable Cronbach’s alpha values. 
As can be seen in Table 5.7, it is the case that we have somewhat low Cronbach’s alpha values 
for the Omnibus 2007 samples. However, the values of both surveys – full samples as well as 
subsamples - pass by the minimum alpha-value criterion of 0,6, and Omnibus 2018 is also well 
above the stricter criterion of 0,7 for both the full sample and the subsample. 
 
Table 5.7  Cronbach’s alpha values 
Survey Cronbach’s alpha 
Omnibus 2007, full sample 0,6451 
Omnibus 2007, Western subsample 0,6214 
Omnibus 2018, full sample 0,7653 
Omnibus 2018, Western subsample 0,8044 
 
Overall, our composite measure passes most criteria for unidimensionality and internal 
consistency, with a note of caution for some low factor loadings and a single low item-item 
correlation. Mostly these problems seem to be associated with question number 1 in the surveys. 
Most measures also indicate that the composite measure works best for the 2018 survey, and it is 
probably sound for our analysis that we do not have to rely on the 2007 survey alone. This is true 








Importantly, we have now showed empirically that it is meaningful to talk about such a concept 
as “democratic political culture” in Ukraine. 
5.3.4 Distributions of values on composite measures 
By following the procedures for making of composite measures we have obtained a 12-step index 
of commitment to democratic values. From Table 5.8, Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 we can see the 
distribution of values on this index. From both the figures it seems that the distributions are left-
skewed. The same can be seen on the histograms for the subsamples, which are placed in the 
Appendix (A7-A8). We can also see a quite high concentration on the maximum value in both 
surveys. We will comment on consequences of the way the dependent variable is distributed in 
Chapter 6.3. The absolute scores on the indexes are not meaningful in themselves, and in the 
regression analysis we will standardize the indexes so that they get a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one. 
 
Table 5.8 Distributions of values on index of commitment to democratic values 








Median Mode Min 
Omnibus 2007, full sample 2032 169 1863 11,04 2,72 11 12 3 
Omnibus 2007, subsample 492 25 447 11,38 2,25 12 12  
Omnibus 2018, full sample 2043 82 1961 10,90 2,91 11 12 3 







Figure 5.1 Distribution of values on                         Figure 5.2 Distribution of values on 
index, Omnibus 2007                                                 index, Omnibus 2018 








5.4 How to conduct the regression analysis 
We will in this subchapter explain why we will conduct an OLS-regression with dummy 
variables, look at how other authors have done this, and see how we are improving the methods 
that have been used earlier. Before we do that, we will have a short look at alternatives to OLS-
regression and explain why we do not use these. 
5.4.1 Multilevel modelling 
Multilevel modelling is often seen as the best suited method in situations where the data have a 
multilevel structure, as when respondents are nested in groups with substantial between-group 
differences. If data with a multilevel structure are analyzed by OLS-regression it can lead to 
biased standard errors and thus biased significance tests. A multilevel model can be particularly 
very well suited in a situation where the researcher’s primary interest is how context effects 
affects individual level behavior (Hox 2010). All of this points to that multilevel analysis is a 
possible alternative for us. However, there are other reasons why a multilevel analysis is not an 
option in our case. 
 
According to Hox (2010, 233-235) the number of level 2-units in a multilevel model should be 
around 30 with around 30 level 1-units (respondents) from each of the level 2-units. If we had a 
survey that was stratified according to all 26 oblasts, and where simple random sampling had 
been done in all of these oblasts, a multilevel analysis could probably have been conducted, even 
though we would then have been in the lower end of acceptable numbers of level 2-units. 
However, since only 23 oblasts were fully available for sampling to Omnibus 2018,70 we would 
stretch the benchmark criterion of 30 level 2-units even further,71 Still, in our case there are other 
aspects of the surveys that would cause even bigger trouble. We have already mentioned the 
problems of representativeness on the oblast-level, and it would be very problematic to 
investigate context effects on individual oblasts if the samples are not representative. Our surveys 
are stratified according to urban and rural areas of all oblasts, but respondents are ultimately 
nested in SSUs and TSUs, and it is normally on this lowest level of clustering that the largest 
                                               
70 Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts are largely not accessible for interviewers due to the ongoing war, and Crimea is 
completely inaccessible after the annexation by Russia. 
71 Some authors would recommend conducting a multilevel analysis even with a very low number of level 2-units, as 







context effects are visible (Asparouhov & Muthen 2006, 2718). A proper multilevel analysis of 
our data would thus have to use the SSUs and TSUs as level 2-units. However, we are not 
interested in such extremely local context effects, and we do not even have a variable in our 
datasets that identifies the clusters that respondents are drawn from. Instead of relying on non-
representative individual oblasts and making a multilevel model, we will therefore conduct an 
OLS-regression with regional dummy variables, as is to our knowledge done by all authors who 
are investigating regional differences in political culture in Ukraine. 
5.4.2 Other strategies 
A version of the analytical strategy of dummy-regions, which is used by Becker et al. (2016, 41-
42) and Peisakhin (2015), and which puts very high demands on the sampling of the surveys, is to 
use samples drawn only from a narrow belt along defunct borders. This gives a very high level of 
control for other variables, as regions normally will become more unequal - both with regards to 
the distribution of individual level characteristics and with regards to context-level characteristics 
- the further away from the border one moves in any direction. Using this strategy alone, 
however, will not reveal anything about the impact of historical legacies on the country’s overall 
patterns of political culture. Another analytical strategy, spatial regression discontinuity,72 is used 
by Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya (2015) in the case of Poland. This also puts much higher demands on 
the surveys than we can afford, as it requires a high number of sampling points as well as exact 
knowledge about the geographical location of the sampling points. 
5.4.3 OLS-regression with dummy variables 
When we use regional dummy variables for testing regional effects, we are in effect testing if 
there are still significant differences in the dependent variable between regions after controlling 
for the impact of individual level independent variables. Thus, respondents’ region of residence is 
a residual category which picks up all differences which are left after these controls have been 
done. Interpretations of what causes these differences thus need to be very well founded in 
theory, as we are only testing how region of residence impacts the dependent variable, and not, as 
                                               
72 This involves testing for discontinuities of the dependent variable exactly at some border and requires exact 
knowledge of the geographical position of the sampling units, as well as a high number of sampling units. In our case 
we do not know the exact position of the sampling units, and we also have few sampling units. See Grosfeld & 







we are interested in in our case, the impact of historical legacies per se. The more we can assure 
ourselves that the regional differences that we observe are not caused by other factors, the 
stronger becomes our belief in historical legacies as the cause of this effect. 
 
In Chapter 5.2.1 we explained why issues related to representativeness make it problematic to 
study individual oblasts. By grouping together similar oblasts we can obtain larger regions with a 
higher overall representativeness. We have already (in Chapter 4.4) shown how the oblasts of 
Ukraine can be grouped together according to their similarities. The ten groups of oblasts that 
were shown on Figure 4.11 will be used as dummy regions in our analysis, with distributions of 
respondents as shown in Table 5.9.  
 
Table 5.9               Dummy regions and distribution of respondents 
Number of region Region Number of respondents, 
Omnibus 2007 
Number of respondents, 
Omnibus 2018 
1 Galicia 210 260 
2 Volhynia 90 110 
3 West Central 192 220 
4 Kiev 188 240 
5 Central 286 320 
6 South 206 231 
7 East Central 360 400 
8 Donbass 314 130 
9 Crimea 98 0 
10 South-West73 88 132 
 Total number of respondents 2032 2043 
Table 5.9: The total number of respondents is approximately the same in the two surveys, but as Crimea and much of 
Donbass is not included in Omnibus 2018, there is a higher number of respondents distributed on other regions in 
Omnibus 2018 than in Omnibus 2007. 
 
The point of constructing regional dummy variables that are suited for investigation of historical 
legacies needs emphasis, as it is not always followed up in studies of political culture in Ukraine. 
We have in earlier subchapters seen the role played by regional strata when assessing the 
representativeness of surveys on sub-national levels. What is done in surveys of political culture 
                                               
73 As we have explained earlier, Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi have experienced historical developments that differ 
strongly both from all other oblasts and from each other. These oblasts should therefore be investigated individually, 
but that is of course not possible with the limitations we have on regional representativeness. These oblasts are also 
among the ethnically, linguistically and religously most hetrogenous oblasts in Ukraine, which makes the expected 
impact of the particular sampling points very high. It thus becomes meaningless to investigate these oblasts closer 
with the surveys we have at hand. We merge them together to the region Southwest, and we will not give them more 








in Ukraine is to stick to regional strata as regional dummy variables (or eventually merging strata 
together in order to form larger regional dummy variables). In Chapter 4.5 we discussed the 
regional frameworks that have been used in the literature and found mismatches between 
historical regions and the regions that were used as dummy variables by the authors. Some of the 
reason for these mismatches is that surveys are generally not stratified according to the regions 
that are of highest interest when investigating historical legacies. One of the main reasons for our 
choice of surveys was that the Omnibus surveys are stratified according to all oblasts, which 
facilitates comparison with high precision. 
 
Another feature of the Omnibus 2018 survey is that it includes a variable that tells the 
respondents’ religion. We have seen that control for Greek-Catholic religion is necessary in order 
to test H1 against H1a, but many surveys do give this possibility. Person (2010) and ICDT 
(2015), who find a positive effect on commitment to democratic values from living in Western 
Ukraine do not control for religion. Katchanovski (2018), who generally does not find such an 
effect, does control for religion, and finds that Greek Catholics are more committed to democratic 
values than others. In our case we obtain control for Greek Catholic religion, and we can also 
make tests with a higher geographical precision than was done by ICDT (2015), Katchanovski 
(2018) and Person (2010). 
 
In order to test H1 and H2 we will make use of only the western subsample consisting of Galicia 
(1), Volhynia (2) and West Central (3), since no other regions are involved in these hypotheses. 
We will thus also make sure that values on individual level variables of respondents in other 
regions do not have an impact on the calculation of the regional effects. In order to test H3, and 
for some further exploration, we will use the full sample with all ten dummy regions. As a part of 
that exploration we will also conduct an interaction model with interactions between regions and 
ethnolinguistic groups, in order to look closer at regional differences and developments in the 
effect of belonging to a certain ethnolinguistic group. 
 
In Chapter 4 we discussed how Ukraine’s regions differ in their historical experiences, 
demography and economic outlook, and we summarized the most important aspects of this in 







specific regional-level independent variable only if the regions that are compared are similar on 
other variables. If regions differ on more than one variable, the independent impact of these 
variables cannot be distinguished from each other. As we move eastward from the former 
imperial borders, regions become increasingly different from Galicia. We must therefore 
recognize that the further away from the imperial borders we move, the less precise judgements 
we can make about the impact of any specific variable on a region’s democratic political culture 
as compared to Galicia. Still, as we test H3, we will do our best to discuss which other factors 
than historical legacies that we find to be important in the makeup of Ukraine’s geographical 
patterns of democratic culture. 
 
In addition to controlling for religion and ethnolinguistic group, we will control for respondents’ 
level education, age, gender, urban versus rural residence and income. The operationalization of 
control variables which are not of direct relevance to our hypothesis testing - education, urban vs 
rural residence, age and gender - can be found in the Appendix (A9-A12). Except for this is the 
income-variable, which needs to be discussed here. 
5.5 Operationalization of independent variables 
Greek Catholic: Needed for testing of H1 is a dichotomous variable which distinguishes between 
those who are Greek Catholics and those who are not. Values 1-3 and 5-11 on variable D8 in 
Omnibus 2018 are here combined as Other.74 (0=Other, 1=Greek Catholic Church) 
 
Table 5.10  Distribution of respondents on variable Greek Catholic, Western subsample of 
Omnibus 2018 
Religion Galicia Volhynia West Central 
0 Other 140 109 219 
1 Greek Catholic Church 120 1 1 
Total 260 110 220 
 
 
                                               
74 The religion-variable (D8) only appears in Omnibus 2018, and not in Omnibus 2007. As no codebook nor any 
questionnaire from Omnibus 2018 has been published, we have declared all the values on this variable in the 
Appendix. All other variables appear in both Omnibus 2018 and Omnibus 2007, and we therefore refer to the 
questionnaire for Omnibus 2007 (KIIS 2007b) (in Russian language) for information about the other variables (no 
separate codebook has been published). As will be discussed in this subchapter, the income-variable is coded 
differently in Omnibus 2007 and Omnibus 2018, and we therefore also declare the values of the income-variable 







Ethnolinguistic group: We create a categorical variable that combines nationality and language 
and maintain as separate values the three theoretically interesting groups which were discussed in 
Chapter 4.3.1, Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality, Russian-speaker of Ukrainian 
nationality and Russian. As there is also a significant group which are coded as mixed speakers, 
we keep that group as well. (1=Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality, 2=Mixed 
Ukrainian/Russian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality, 3=Russian-speaker of Ukrainian 
nationality, 4=Russian nationality, 5=Other).  
 
Table 5.11 Distribution of respondents on variable Ethnolinguistic group 




1 Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians 758 1044 
2 Mixed-speaking Ukrainians 590 553 
3 Russian-speaking Ukrainians 234 266 
4 Russians 335 86 
5 Others 115 94 
6 Total 2032 2043 
 
Dichotomous ethnolinguistic group: The regional samples are too small for interaction between 
region and five ethnolinguistic groups to be meaningful, and we will thus have to simplify this 
variable for the interaction models.75 We make the ethnolinguistic group variable dichotomous by 
combining group 2, 3, 4 and 5: (0=Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality, 1=Non-Ukrainian 
speaker). 
 
Table 5.12 Ethnolinguistic groups by region, Omnibus 2007 





Galicia 198 12 210 
South-West 65 23 88 
Volhynia 87 3 90 
West Central 143 49 192 
Kiev 74 114 188 
Central 134 152 286 
South 41 165 206 
East Central 15 345 360 
Donbass 1 313 314 
Crimea 0 98 98 







                                               
75 We here have a problem of potentially over-fitting of the model. When comparing the AIC for interaction models 
where the five-value ethnolinguistic group variable is used with the AIC for models where the simplified 
ehnolinguistic group variable is used, the latter value is around 20 lower than the former. The interaction model with 
















Galicia 255 5 260 
South-West 118 14 132 
Volhynia 107 3 110 
West Central 199 21 220 
Kiev 93 147 240 
Central 152 168 320 
South 31 200 231 
East Central 89 311 400 
Donbass 0 130 130 
Total 1044 999 2043 
 
The income-variable is the only variable that is measured differently in the two surveys. In 
Omnibus 2007 respondents are asked what types of goods they can afford and what they cannot 
afford, whereas in Omnibus 2018 respondents are placed in nine income-categories. The measure 
in Omnibus 2007 can be divided into two roughly equally large groups that make up a 
dichotomous variable: Those who can cover their subsistence needs (those who can afford both 
food and clothes) and those who cannot. Regarding the income measure in Omnibus 2018 we 
have a problem, since as much as 26 % of the total sample either has refused to answer or has 
answered that they do not know their income. This number gets as high as 44 % in the Western 
subsample, which is already in the lower end of acceptable sample sizes. Our first solution here 
becomes to create a dichotomous variable of as close as we can get to the same distribution as the 
dichotomous variable from Omnibus 2007 by combining the five lowest income groups into one 
group, and all other values into a second group. In addition to this we have run a regression 
where the income variable in Omnibus 2018 is kept as a categorical variable. This brings only 
small changes to the effect and significance of other variables. This model can be found in the 
Appendix. 
 
Table 5.14 Distribution of respondents on variable Low income 




0 Other  959 1078 
1 Low income 1059 965 









We are now ready for trying to give an answer to the research question, “Can legacies from 
historical regimes explain the regional patterns of democratic political culture in Ukraine?” 
 
We will start by presenting some descriptive statistics and then proceed by presenting two 
regression tables, Table 6.1 and Table 6.2. Table 6.1 will contain regression models where only 
the western subsample is used, and Table 6.2 will contain regression models where the whole 
Ukrainian sample is used. Based on the results from Table 6.1 we will either keep or reject H1, 
H1a, H2 and H2a. Based on the results from Table 6.2 we will either keep or reject H3, and the 
results from Table 6.2 will then serve as a basis for further investigation of the research question. 
6.1 Descriptive results 
To begin with we will look at the average values of the index of democratic culture for the ten 
Ukrainian regions, visualized in the form of two colored maps, one for each survey. 
 
We will repeat that the main point of using two surveys from different points in time is to 
increase our confidence that the geographical patterns of democratic culture that we ascribe to 
historical legacies are actually stable patterns. This is especially important in light of the dramatic 
events in 2014,76 and by employing one survey conducted before and one survey conducted after 
these events we will be sure that what we take as stable patterns are neither caused by nor have 
been erased by these events. However, as the 2007 survey is lacking one important demographic 
variable (the variable of religion), only the 2018 survey can give us the control that we need in 
order to test H1 against H1a.77 Still, as Greek Catholic religion is expected only to increase 
people’s commitment do democratic values, a finding in the 2007 survey of no positive effect of 
living in Galicia when controlled for all other variables than religion would in effect mean a 
                                               
76 We are here referring to the Euromaidan, War in Donbass and annexation of Crimea. The War in Donbass was 
still ongoing when the 2018 survey was conducted. 
77 As we have seen, the lack of control for religion, or more specifically the lack of control for Greek Catholicism, is 
a recurring problem in research on democratic culture in Ukraine. Person (2010) and ICDT (2015), who find that 
residence in Western Ukraine increase people’s commitment to democratic values, are using surveys that do not give 
the possibility to control for religion. This is despite that other findings, as Drummond & Lubecki (2010) and 







rejection of both H1 and H1a. A second reason why it is desirable to use two surveys is that we 
are probably operating at the margins of what these surveys can be used for. In Chapter 5.2.1 we 
discussed how the methodology used in these surveys can lead to deflated calculated standard 
errors. By relying on two surveys instead of just one, we are decreasing the possibility that we are 
drawing conclusions based on false positives. 
 









Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 reveal some recurring patterns in the 2007 and 2018 surveys. In both 
cases, Galicia has a higher average value on the index of democratic culture than both Volhynia 







results rule out H1a. We can further see that the difference between Volhynia and West Central is 
very small, which is not according to the expectations from H2 and H2a. When we move further 
to the east, we see that in both cases the Central region has a lower average value than Volhynia 
and West Central, while Kiev has a higher average than its surrounding regions. Still, Kiev in 
both surveys is having a lower average value than Galicia. When we pass the “line of 
industrialization” (discussed in Chapter 3.2.2) and enter the South and East Central regions, the 
average values are in both surveys higher here than in the Central, West Central and Volhynia 
regions. Further to the east and south the level of democratic culture goes down again, as 
Donbass and Crimea are among the regions with the lowest average values in 2007, and Donbass 
has by far the lowest value in 2018.78 Galicia has the second highest average value in both 
surveys. In the 2007 survey the Southwest region has the highest value,79 while in 2018 South has 
the highest average value. In other words, H3 seems not to be supported. We also note that there 
seems to have been a general fall in the level of commitment to democratic values between the 
surveys except for in Galicia and Kiev as well as in South, which looks like an outlier here. 
 
In sum the descriptive results indicate that there is a particularly high level of democratic culture 
in the former Habsburg province of Galicia, but we can also see that there is not a uniform, low 
level of democratic culture in all of the regions that went directly from Russian imperial rule to 
rule by the Soviet Union. The areas that experienced Russian imperial rule, but that escaped rule 
by the Soviet Union until World War 2 (Volhynia), seem not to have a particularly high level of 
democratic culture. We will now go on with the regression analyses where the hypotheses will be 
tested. 
6.2 Regression analyses 
We will now proceed with the regression analyses, through which we will test our hypotheses. As 
outlined in Chapter 4.4, H1 and H2 will be tested by comparing the effect of living in regions that 
are as similar as possible, and that have gone through the same historical developments except for 
certain periods when they were underlaid different political regimes. If there is a significant 
                                               
78 We should, however, not forget that the sample from Donbass in 2018 is taken only from the areas that are under 
control of the Ukrainian government and is thus not directly comparable to the Donbass sample from 2007. 








regional effect when we have controlled also for individual-level variables, we will conclude that 
developments in the periods when the regions in question were underlaid different political 
regimes gave rise to historical legacies in the form of different levels of democratic political 
culture. 
 
Table 6.1 Regression table, Western subsample80 















VARIABLES index2007 index2007 index2018 index2018 index2018 
      
Region (Baseline: 
Galicia) 
     
     Volhynia (2) -0.244**  -0.348*** -0.383***  
 (0.124)  (0.0975) (0.111)  
     West Central (3) -0.334***  -0.354*** -0.388***  
 (0.0891)  (0.0971) (0.111)  
Region (Baseline: 
Volhynia) 
     
     Galicia (1)  0.263**   0.347*** 
  (0.124)   (0.0969) 
     West Central (3)  -0.0484   -0.0209 
  (0.127)   (0.106) 
Greek Catholic    -0.0756  






     
   Russian-speaking 
Ukrainian 
-0.606  -0.979** -0.981***  
 (0.581)  (0.379) (0.379)  
   Mixed-speaking 
Ukrainian 
0.485***  0.231 0.222  
 (0.130)  (0.470) (0.471)  
   Russian -0.0515  0.573** 0.593**  
 (0.196)  (0.246) (0.235)  
   Other 0.0739  0.205 0.196  
 (0.279)  (0.311) (0.313)  
Constant 0.340* 0.0737 0.392*** 0.428*** 0.0481 
 (0.182) (0.178) (0.131) (0.134) (0.141) 
      
Observations 440 440 567 567 567 
R-squared 0.066 0.048 0.105 0.106 0.094 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
                                               








In Table 6.1, Model 1-West 2007 and Model 2-West 2007 are analyses of the 2007 survey, while 
Model 3-West 2018, Model 4-West 2018 and Model 5-West 2018 are analyses of the 2018 survey. 
We will now explain how these models are constructed in order to test H1 and H2. 
 
For H1 or H1a to be supported there needs to be a significant negative effect of Volhynia as 
compared to Galicia. If this negative effect does not disappear when controlling for the effect of 
Greek Catholic religion, then H1 is supported. If the negative effect does disappear when 
controlling for Greek Catholic religion, then H1a is supported. In Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 we 
saw that Galicia has a higher average value on the index than both Volhynia and West Central in 
both surveys. In Model 1-West 2007 and Model 3-West 2018 we can see that there is a significant 
negative effect of both Volhynia and West Central also when controlling for all individual-level 
variables except for Greek Catholic religion. These effects are significant at the 5 %-level in 
Model 1-West 2007, and at the 1 %-level in Model 3-2018. In the 2018 survey we have the 
possibility to also control for Greek Catholic religion. This is done in Model 4-West 2018, where 
we can see that there is no effect of Greek Catholic, and that the negative effects of both Volhynia 
and West Central thus stay significant at the 1 %-level. This means that we can reject H1a. Our 
findings are thus supportive of H1, 
“To live in Galicia has a positive effect on commitment to democratic values as compared 
to living in Volhynia”. 
 
We will now proceed with the testing of H2. For H2 or H2a to be supported there needs to be a 
significant, negative effect of West Central as compared to Volhynia. As we have already seen 
from Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2, the average score on the index is very close for these two regions 
in both surveys. In Model 2-West 2007 and Model 5-West 2018 we can see that there is no 
significant effect of West Central as compared to Volhynia in any of the surveys, when controlled 
for all individual-level variables except for ethnolinguistic group. A Ukrainian-speaker of 
Ukrainian nationality dummy variable should have been introduced in order to test H2 against 
H2a, but as both H2 and H2a can be rejected on basis of the results from Model 2-West 2007 and 
Model 5-West 2018, we do not go further and include the Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian 
nationality dummy variable here.81 
                                               
81 A model which includes a Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality dummy variable has also been run, without 








As we have now seen that there is no significant effect of West Central as compared to Volhynia 
in any of the surveys, which means that both H2 and H2a are rejected, and H2null is kept: 
“There is no difference in people’s commitment to democratic values between Volhynia 
and West Central.”  
 
We have now concluded that H1 should be kept, while both H2 and H2a are rejected, and we will 
now proceed with the testing of H3, and after that do some further exploration of patterns of 
democratic political culture in Ukraine. In the following models we include the dummy variables 
of Volhynia and West Central, but as we have already tested the effects of these dummy regions 
under more controlled circumstances, we will not comment more on them here. 
 
H3 is concerning the regional average level on the index when not controlling for any variables. 
The first thing we will do is to look at Model 6 2007-no control and Model 7 2018-no control in 
Table 6.2 to see the same patterns that we have already seen in Figure 14 and Figure 15, but now 
with significance tests of the difference between Galicia and each other region. As was already 
clear from Figure 14 and Figure 15, Galicia has a high level of democratic culture, and while 
other regions fluctuate more between the surveys, Galicia stays consistently at a high level. In the 
2007 survey no eastern regions have a higher level than Galicia, but in 2018 Galicia is beaten by 
the South region, as can be seen in Model 7 2018-no control. And in Model 6 2007-no control we 
can see that East Central, even though it has a negative sign, is not significantly different from 
Galicia. Kiev is in this model only weakly negatively significant. In other words, although 
Galicia is clearly one of the regions with the highest average value of commitment to democratic 
values, H3 is rejected, and we keep H3null, 
H3null: Galicia does not have a higher average level of commitment to democratic values 













Table 6.2 Regression table, full sample  
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
 2007- 















VARIABLES index index index index index index index index 
Region (Baseline: Galicia)         
   Volhynia (2) -0.235* -0.427***   -0.233* -0.386*** -0.236* -0.371*** 
 (0.123) (0.111)   (0.121) (0.102) (0.124) (0.103) 
   West Central (3) -0.296*** -0.409***   -0.326*** -0.376*** -0.301*** -0.401*** 
 (0.0841) (0.0974)   (0.0883) (0.0977) (0.0923) (0.100) 
   Kiev (4) -0.256*** -0.173*   -0.385*** 0.0364 -0.239* 0.140 
 (0.0899) (0.0979)   (0.105) (0.0994) (0.143) (0.119) 
   Central (5) -0.603*** -0.459***   -0.719*** -0.206** -0.992*** -0.170* 
 (0.0953) (0.0839)   (0.107) (0.0876) (0.132) (0.0994) 
   South (6) -0.185** 0.251***   -0.385*** 0.606*** 0.0559 1.108*** 
 (0.0908) (0.0919)   (0.110) (0.100) (0.157) (0.0808) 
   East Central (7) -0.130 -0.392***   -0.343*** -0.0549 0.0548 -0.163 
 (0.0812) (0.0880)   (0.107) (0.0955) (0.214) (0.125) 
   Donbass (8) -0.513*** -0.621***   -0.712*** -0.200 -0.870*** -0.848*** 
 (0.0800) (0.113)   (0.112) (0.133) (0.257) (0.289) 
   Crimea (9) -0.500***    -0.755***  -0.911***  
 (0.161)    (0.181)  (0.293)  
   Southwest (10) 0.299** -0.261**   0.238* -0.217* 0.379*** -0.303*** 
 (0.120) (0.109)   (0.126) (0.112) (0.143) (0.116) 
Ethno-linguistic group (Baseline: 
Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian 
nationality) 
        
   Russian-speaking Ukrainian   0.00903 -0.175*** 0.254*** -0.393***   
   (0.0664) (0.0639) (0.0888) (0.0749)   
   Mixed-speaking Ukrainian   0.144* -0.263*** 0.327*** -0.421***   
   (0.0775) (0.0792) (0.0887) (0.0839)   
   Russian   -0.0494 -0.0590 0.219** -0.235*   
   (0.0808) (0.124) (0.0996) (0.138)   
   Other   0.0969 -0.129 0.319*** -0.344**   
   (0.104) (0.128) (0.122) (0.137)   
Constant 0.290*** 0.274*** 0.0296 0.337*** 0.262** 0.453*** 0.245** 0.445*** 
 (0.0582) (0.0635) (0.109) (0.0791) (0.117) (0.0937) (0.117) (0.0946) 
         
Observations 1,863 1,961 1,836 1,960 1,836 1,960 1,836 1,960 
R-squared 0.054 0.061 0.012 0.042 0.068 0.108 0.086 0.121 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We will, however, not just stop there, but continue exploring why H3 is rejected, and thus try to 
further answer the research question. Firstly, we note from Model 6 2007-no control and Model 7 
2018-no control that most regions do concur with our expectations, as we have also seen from 
Figure 16 and Figure 17. Donbass and Central are strongly negative in both models, while 
Crimea is strongly negative in the model where it appears. Kiev is negative in both models, 
although only weakly significant in Model 7 2018-no control, East Central is significantly 









We will proceed with showing a model that includes all demographic variables, including an 
interaction term between region and ethnolinguistic group. This enables us to investigate how 
regional effects on ethnolinguistic groups vary between regions. As we will see, this can shed 
some more light on how Ukraine’s political culture has developed, and also how it continues to 
develop partly in response to actions made by foreign powers. We will now remind ourselves that 
our level of control for historical development and other regional-level variables is much lower 
for the Eastern regions than for our Western subsample. The Western subsample consisted of 
three regions that are very similar to each other, and where clearly defined historical borders 
between former states and empires coincide with present-day borders between oblasts. When we 
observed an effect on commitment to democratic values from living in one of the three regions in 
the Western subsample as compared to the others, we could therefore confidently point to 
different historical developments in certain clearly defined periods of time as the root causes of 
present-day differences in political culture. A similar situation as this does not exist in other parts 
of Ukraine, and when we observe regional effects further East, we can thus not confidently point 
to certain factors or periods in the past which have given rise to regional differences in political 
culture. An assessment of regional effects in the East could, however, tell us something about 
how important historical legacies are compared to other pathways to a high level of democratic 
political culture. 
 
We will start by looking at the effects of the ethnolinguistic group variable. From Model 8 2007-
ethnoling and Model 9 2018-ethnoling, where we have not included the region-variable, we can 
see the overall effect of ethnolinguistic group belonging when not taking into account different 
regional means on the index. While there is no effect of being Russian in any of these models,82 a 
negative effect of being Russian-speaking Ukrainian appears in Model 8 2018-ethnoling.83 When 
we proceed by including also the regional dummy variables, we can see that all values on the 
ethnolinguistic group variable that are compared to the baseline group Ukrainian-speaker of 
Ukrainian nationality becomes positive and significant in Model 10 2007-control, while in Model 
                                               
82 We should now remember that the groups of Russians in the 2018 survey is very small, as this can make it harder 
to find significant results. 







11 2018-control all values become negative and significant. This has to do with the models that 
include regional dummies being in effect fixed-effects models, where calculations of effects of 
individual-level variables are done as group means are kept fixed for the various regions. In other 
words, there seems to be a tendency of polarization inside the regions between the baseline group 
Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian nationality on the one hand and all other ethnolinguistic groups 
on the other hand. 
 
At first glance it looks like there has been a fundamental shift in terms of regional patterns of 
commitment to democratic values in the time period between 2007 and 2018, and a comparison 
of the effects of the regional dummy variables in Model 10 2007-control and Model 11 2018-
control show large differences for all regions to the East of the West Central region.84 What we 
see here has to do with a problem that arises because of multicollinearity.85 Because the 
ethnolinguistic group dummies have opposite signs in the 2007 and 2018 surveys, the calculated 
regional effects in Model 10 2007-control and Model 11 2018-control becomes very different 
from each other. For example, the effect of Donbass is strongly significant and negative when not 
controlled for ethnolinguistic group in both surveys (Model 6 2007-no control and Model 7 2018-
no control), and then the regional effects become much stronger in Model 2007-control, but is 
explained away in the Model 11 2018-control. This happens even though (as we will see), 
nothing has substantially changed either in Donbass or in the baseline region of Galicia. 
 
It thus makes more sense to look at regional effects on the ethnolinguistic groups separately. 
In the interaction model, ethnolinguistic group is made dichotomous with Ukrainian-speaking 
                                               
84  The effect Kiev goes from being negative and strongly significant to becoming positive and non-significant, 
Central is negative and significant in both models while the strength of the effect is falling between 2007 and 2018, 
South goes from being negative and significant into becoming strongly positive and significant, East Central goes 
from being negative and strongly significant into becoming non-significant, and Donbass goes from being negative 
and very strong and significant into becoming non-significant. 
85 As we have seen in Figure 4.1 as well as from Table 5.12 and Table 5.13, in the westernmost regions (and 
especially Galicia and Volhynia) almost all of the population and almost the whole sample consist of Ukrainian-
speakers of Ukrainian nationality. This situation is completely opposite in the eastern regions of Crimea, Donbass, 
where there are practically speaking no Ukrainian-speakers in the samples, and also in East Central and South, where 
Ukrainian-speakers are in a very small minority. If we pairwise compare samples from individual dummy regions 
with the Galician sample (Galicia is the baseline regional dummy), we will therefore see a very high correlation 
between ethnolinguistic group and some pairs of regional dummy variables. This will have an impact on the 








Ukrainian as baseline and all others as the second category. Interaction terms are omitted from 
the table due to space constraints,86 but we will present the results graphically. The regional 
effects that are printed for the interaction models in Table 6.2 should be interpreted as regional 
effects on the regions’ population of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, as compared to the baseline 
group of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians in Galicia. (For Donbass and Crimea, where there are no 
Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, the regional effect in Table 6.2 means the effect on the “Other”-
group, as compared to Galicia’s small “Other” group.) 
 
Starting with East Central, we see that the situation is stable between 2007 and 2018 - there is no 
significant regional effect on Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians in East Central either in Model 12 
2007-interaction or in Model 13 2018-interaction. For South, there is no significant effect on 
Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians in 2007, but a very strong positive and significant effect in 2018, 
for Central there is a strong negative and significant effect in 2007 and a weaker negative effect 
in 2018 which is significant only at the 10 % level. Kiev is negative but significant only at the 10 
% level in 2007 and have no significant effect in 2018. 
 
The last points of our analysis of the results from Table 6.2 are most easily seen when results are 
presented in the form of figures. Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 show the predicted margins of the two 
ethnolinguistic groups in all regions87. We should also be very careful about drawing conclusions 
about the Other-group, where the four ethnolinguistic groups that are not Ukrainian-speaking 
Ukrainians are combined into a single group,88 but there is one tendency which is very clearly 
shown on Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 and which deserves to be mentioned here: In the Central 
region the relationship between the two groups has turned around, as Ukrainian-speaking 
Ukrainians has gone from having a much lower point estimate in 2007 into having a higher point 
estimate in 2018. In Kiev and South, a difference between the ethnolinguistic groups has occurred 
that was not there before, as Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians now have higher point estimates 
                                               
86 See Appendix for full table with interaction terms. 
87 We should start by emphasize that there is a difference between predicted margins and estimated differences 
between groups. Overlapping confidence intervals for the predicted margins do not necessarily mean that two groups 
are not significantly different from each other - differences between groups have to be calculated separately, as we 
have done for differences from Galicia in the regression tables. 
88 The regional samples are too small for keeping all ethnolinguistic groups in the interaction model. The results 
from the fixed-effects models (Model 2007-control and Model 2018-control in Table 6.2), show that these four other 








than Others. In other words, there seems to be a growing discrepancy between Ukrainian-
speaking Ukrainians and Others in their level of commitment to democratic values in the regions 
where both of these groups are represented by a substantial amount of the sample.  
 
Figure 6.3      Figure 6.4   
Figure 16: The predicted marginal values of the dependent                   Figure 17: The predicted marginal values of                
variable for ethnolinguistic groups in regions, Omnibus 2007.               the dependent variable for ethnolinguistic    
                             groups, Omnibus 2018. 
 
6.3 Assumptions of OLS regression and model diagnosis 
The basic assumption of OLS regression is that relationships between the independent variables 
and the dependent variable are linear (Midtbø 2012, 130). In our case, however, all independent 
variables are categorical, which means that all effects are calculated as differences between the 
baseline category and only one other category. We thus have already fulfilled the requirement of 
linear relationships (Geman & Hill 2007, 46, 66-67), as a best-fitted line between two points can 
not be anything else than linear. The remaining most important assumptions of OLS regression 
are concerning the residuals, which should be independent, homoscedastic and normally 
distributed (Midtbø 2012, 106; Gelman & Hill 2007, 46). We have in Chapter 5.2.1 already 
touched upon the problem of dependence between respondents - and thus also residuals - that are 
drawn from the same sampling unit, and concluded that this might be a source of inflated 







Regarding the questions of homoscedasticity we will refer to figures in the Appendix (A13-A16). 
These figures show residuals plotted against fitted values, and the first thing we will note from 
these figures are the characteristic lines that appears as a consequence of our dependent variable 
being discrete. This makes it more difficult to look for pattern in the residuals, as the number of 
dots on a line is unclear. A Breusch-Pagan test indicates that there is a problem of 
heteroscedasticity for the full models where all dummy-regions are included, and no such 
problem for the western subsample. In order to correct for any problem of heteroscedasticity we 
have run models with robust (White-Huber) standard errors89 (Midtbø 2012, 109-110; Stata 
2018b, 49-50). Regarding questions of normality of the residuals we will refer to figures in the 
Appendix (A17-A20). There can be seen signs of a curve, especially in the 2007 samples, 
indicating a skewness in the distribution of the dependent variable.90 However, non-normality of 
residuals is the least important assumption (Gelman & Hill 2007, 46).91 VIF-tests have been run 
and showb that we do not have any problem of multicollinearity in our models, as we have no 





7.1 Main findings 
We have in this thesis made an effort to answer the research question “Can geographical 
patterns of democratic political culture in Ukraine be explained by the historical legacies of 
former empires and states?”. This has been done by following the suggestions of Peisakhin 
(2015) and Pop-Eleches & Tucker (2017) about exploiting the special feature of Ukraine as a 
natural experiment of history. We have found that there is a major threshold in people’s 
commitment to democratic values at the long defunct border between the Habsburg Empire and 
                                               
89 As is already commented on, we cannot use cluster robust standard errors. 
90 On Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 we can see that distributions are skewed. A logarithmic transformation of the 
dependent variable was tried, but it did not have a large effect on the distribution of the residuals. 
91 Even though it indicates that there are chances that the probabilities of under- or overestimate a value are not 
completely equal (Midtbø 2012, 114). 







the Russian Empire. Our investigation was done in such a way that we could further infer that the 
root causes of the emergence of this threshold are indeed to be found in the particular historical 
developments of the two empires. The Habsburg Empire and the Russian Empire have in other 
words left legacies in the form of different levels of democratic political culture, and these 
legacies can explain some of the geographical patterns of democratic political culture in Ukraine. 
We did not find a similar threshold at the former border between the Soviet Union and Poland, 
except for where this border coincides with the older imperial borders. 
 
Our approach has in this thesis been to conduct an analysis with as high geographical precision as 
possible. This has enabled us both to distinguish between legacies from the age of empires (1772-
1918) and legacies from the inter-war age (1918-1939), and to conduct an analysis where we 
have obtained a high level of control for other historical and contextual variables. In the end our 
findings support authors like Birch (2000), Kuzio (2015) and Person (2010), who suggested that a 
legacy of the Habsburg Empire is a particularly democratic political culture in the former 
Habsburg province of Galicia. At the same time our findings do not support the suggestions made 
by Birch (2000) and Katchanovski (2018) that a present-day consequence of inter-war rule by 
Poland should have led to a more democratic political culture than inter-war rule by the Soviet 
Union. 
 
By managing to control for other variables, we have shown that there really is a threshold in 
democratic culture on the former border between the Habsburg Empire and the Russian Empire. 
Person (2010) could not show that this was the case, and we have now shown that his finding of a 
higher level of commitment to democratic values in Galicia than in the rest of Ukraine was not 
driven only by anti-democratic attitudes in the far East of the country. We have also shown that it 
is not the population of Greek Catholics that is behind the high level of democratic culture in 
Galicia. 
 
Our results can also explain why Katchanovski (2018), Miller, White & Heywood (1998), 
Shulman (2005) and Miller, Klobucar & Reisinger (2000) struggled to find a more democratic 
culture in “Western Ukraine” than in other parts of the country. In all of these cases “Western 







tests have not been run in order to distinguish between imperial legacies and inter-war legacies. 
In these studies, measures have also largely not been taken in order to isolate the historical legacy 
variables from economic and demographic variables. “Western Ukraine” has in many cases been 
compared with large macro-regions that have a high degree of internal variation in terms of level 
of urbanization and socioeconomic development. 
 
By employing a survey that includes all important individual-level demographic variables we 
have also ruled out Miller, Klobucar & Reisinger’s (2000) suggestion that regional differences in 
democratic political culture in Ukraine is due only to an unequal geographical distribution of 
ethnolinguistic and religious groups with different levels of commitment to democratic values. As 
for Katchanovski’s (2018) finding about Greek Catholics being more committed to democratic 
values than others, this can probably be explained by his operationalization of “Western 
Ukraine”: We have found that people in Galicia - regardless of their faith - are more committed to 
democratic values than people in neighbouring regions. Thus, as almost all Greek Catholics live 
in Galicia, when Galicia in Katchanovski’s analysis is merged together with neighbouring regions 
into a larger macro-region, Greek Catholics will be above average committed to democratic 
values among people inside this macro-region. 
 
7.2 Implications of main findings 
Our findings support a narrative that the legacies of policies pursued by the Austro-Hungarian 
empire and the Russian Empire in the late 19th and early 20th century left legacies that are still 
visible today in the form of different levels of democratic political culture in different parts of 
Ukraine. The liberalizing policies pursued by Austria-Hungary in this period made possible the 
spread of mass literacy, development of a civil society, participation in elections, and the spread 
of nationalistic ideas among the ethnic Ukrainian population, aided by members of the clerical 
establishment of the Greek Catholic Church. At the same time the population of the Russian 
empire were subject to an autocratic regime that did not allow for these same processes. The 
comparison of Galicia and Volhynia shows that regions that had exactly the same geopolitical 
development both before and after the period of imperial rule by Austria and Russia today have 
very visible differences in their levels of democratic political culture. Crucial here for enabling us 







commitment to democratic values in Galicia, as we have then ruled out that the higher level of 
democratic culture in Galicia is resulting from the religious composition of its inhabitants. We 
have thus also showed that the Greek Catholics do not follow the pattern of Latin rite (mainline) 
Catholics, who are found to be more committed to democratic values than others in former 
communist countries (Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017). Pop-Eleches & Tucker’s explanation (2017, 
125) for the higher level of democratic values among Catholics is that the calls for resistance 
against communism emanating from the Church and the Pope made Catholics less susceptible to 
indoctrination of communist values. An explanation for the equally high level of commitment to 
democratic values among people of different faiths in Galicia might be that the spread of a pro-
democratic national identity had already “vaccinated” people against communist indoctrination, 
and that external support from the Pope and internal calls for resistance against communism from 
the underground Greek Catholic Church did not add more to people’s pro-democratic and anti-
communist attitudes. However, even though personal belief in the doctrines of the Greek Catholic 
church today does not increase a person’s commitment to democratic values, the Greek Catholic 
church played a key role in the process where a Ukrainian national identity emerged among the 
peasant population in Galicia.  
 
The ultimate causes of the emergence of a democratic political culture in Galicia can be traced 
back to policies and institutions in the Austro-Hungarian empire, and can thus be regarded as a 
legacy in line with Beissinger & Kotkin’s (2014, 7) conceptualization of the term as a “a durable 
causal relationship between past institutions and policies on subsequent practices or beliefs, long 
beyond the life of the regimes, institutions, and policies that gave birth to them”. They emphasise 
that a legacy argument should focus on the origin of the present-day phenomena and the 
relationship between historical causes and present-day outcomes, and not on whether or not 
certain beliefs and practices remain unchanged across time. We are not concluding that 
geographical patterns of democratic political culture rose under imperial rule to stay exactly the 
same ever since. No social phenomenon would stay unaffected by other phenomena through a 
century of shifting historical developments. What we can say from our findings is that the 
present-day effect of developments in the Austro-Hungarian empire is a higher level of 
democratic political culture. The full, theorized causal chain about how the political culture in 







from the Soviet and pre-Soviet eras. Shulman (2005) shows that embedded in the ethnic 
Ukrainian identity complex is a belief in democracy as the preferred political regime, and that 
those who adhere to an ethnic Ukrainian identity therefore are more committed to democratic 
values than others. Person (2010) sees the period of Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine after 
World War 2 as central in strengthening this democratic element of the national identity, as 
official suppression of Ukrainian identity by the Soviet authorities strengthened Galicians’ view 
on themselves as being “democratic Europeans”. Those focusing on the role played by Ukrainian 
national identity in the transition process in the 1990s are emphasizing the potential for anti-
authoritarian protest that lie in a pro-European national identity, and which developed into pro-
democratic actions in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Way 2010). The Omnibus surveys are not 
very well suited for investigation of this aspect of the theory, and our goal has neither been to 
find out how people understood the concept of “democracy” in earlier times or to find out exactly 
at what point people became committed to democratic values in the way we understand it today. 
We will, however, point to the embeddedness of democratic values in a specific “Western” 
version of Ukrainian national identity, and hold national myths and identity as the most plausible 
vehicles for transmission of democratic values. This is in keeping with Almond (1990), who saw 
value commitments associated with ethnicity, nationality and religion as very resistant to change, 
even among populations that were subject to the Soviet Union’s efforts to transform the political 
culture of Eastern Europe. Our line of reasoning thus rests on the notion that cultural identities 
can be embedded with certain worldviews and understandings, as articulated by authors like Ross 
(2000), Laitin (1988) and Shulman (2005). Through the national myth that sees Ukraine as a 
historically democratic nation that belongs to Europe a commitment to democratic values is 
transmitted from one generation to the next. 
 
We could see our findings in the light of Pearson’s (2004) notion of sequencing. In the case 
where a liberal window of opportunity opened for the first time before the onset of communism, 
developments began that lead to the emergence of a national identity that was embedded with 
certain worldviews, and that proved to be resistant to communist indoctrination. Where 
communism arrived first, and a liberal regime was introduced only in 1991, communism made a 
much bigger impact, and the introduction of a liberal regime did (or has not until now) had the 







those actors who were first to exploit the liberal window of opportunity in Galicia was the Greek 
Catholic Church. 
 
The mere experience of living in the context of a democratic country and taking part in 
democratic processes in the interwar-age seems to have made a less lasting impact than the 
experiences related to imperial rule. The only historical period when people in Western Ukraine 
experienced something similar to a real democratic system was the interwar-period, and this 
experience was shared equally by the populations of Galicia and Volhynia, as these regions were 
a part of Poland between the wars. Birch (2000) was of the view that the population under these 
circumstances should develop a commitment to democratic values, and that this commitment 
should have survived through communism and be transmitted to future generations. Another way 
of framing this no-finding is that the impact of Stalinism in the inter-war age does not seem to 
have present-day consequences in the form of a lower level of democratic culture. 
But the most revealing approach is maybe that where a national identity was not developed, 50 
years of communist rule was enough to level out eventual differences in democratic culture that 
existed in the inter-war age. That developments during a 20-year long period of division in the 
inter-war age created less lasting impacts on Ukraine’s political culture than the 140 years long 
division between different empires is maybe not so surprising after all. We should also remember 
the uneven impact of Holodomor in the inter-war age. We saw that the West Central region was 
comparatively less affected by Holodomor than other areas of Ukraine, and perhaps the legacies 
of inter-war Stalinism are therefore weaker in West Central than further east. 
 
7.3 Other findings 
Our research question asks if Ukraine’s geographical patterns of democratic political culture can 
be explained by the historical legacies of former empires and states. Our surveys and research 
design were chosen in order for us to isolate the historical legacy variables, and we found that 
historical legacies from former empires can explain some of the geographical patterns of 
democratic political culture in Ukraine. Galicia proved to have a consistently high level of 
democratic culture, and there were only one of the eight eastern regions that in one of the surveys 
had a higher level. Still, we should not ignore the importance of other factors than historical 







regions of Ukraine in terms of historical development and economic and demographic outlook. 
Thus, we can by means of the chosen surveys and method say less about the Eastern regions. 
Some things seem clear, however. As we move eastwards the impact of ethnolinguistic groups 
becomes a more relevant factor. As practically speaking all of the population (and thus also 
almost the whole sample) in Galicia are Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, it is not a 
straightforward task to investigate the differences in regional effects between Galicia and the 
easternmost regions, where close to the whole population belongs to other ethnolinguistic groups. 
A closer investigation revealed that among Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians there was no regional 
effect in East Central as compared to Galicia in both 2007 and 2018, and in Kiev there was also 
no effect in 2018 and only a weakly significant effect in 2007. This means that two of the 
economically most well developed and most urbanized regions, which are situated to the East of 
the former imperial borders, have a level of democratic culture among its Ukrainian-speaking 
Ukrainians which is at the same level as that of the much poorer and more rural Galicia to the 
west of the old borders. This implies that we are in a situation of causal complexity, as there are 
more than just one factor impacting a society’s level of democratic culture. Another way of 
framing this finding is in terms of equifinality, as it shows that there is more than one historical 
pathway to a democratic culture. In other words, historical legacies are not the same as pre-
determined historical pathways. Our finding points in the same direction as one of the main 
findings of Inglehart & Welzel (2005), namely that both the approach of societal modernization, 
as well as the approach of persistence of traditional cultures, are relevant for explaining the 
emergence of democratic cultures.  
 
The Central region, which lies in the North-Western, less urbanized and less industrialized part 
of the country, and which thus is more comparable to Galicia, shows a pattern of having a lower 
level of democratic political culture than Galicia, as could be expected there. In both surveys the 
Central has either the lowest or the second lowest average value of commitment to democratic 
values, only beaten by Donbass in 2018. From Table 4.1 we can see that the Central region 
together with West Central are the poorest and most rural regions on the eastern side of the old 
imperial and state borders and should thus be expected to have a low level of democratic culture. 
The Central region fared worse than West Central during Holodomor, and if Holodomor really 







Arel (2005), then perhaps this can explain some of the differences between these regions. 
However, the pattern of a very low level of democratic culture is less visible in 2018 than in 
2007. As has also happened in other regions, the average level of commitment to democratic 
values among the Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainian part of the population has risen relatively to the 
Russian- and mixed-speaking population. An increasing difference between Ukrainian-speakers 
and others is in line with what we are expecting from Kulyk’s (2017) results, but what we find is 
perhaps an even bigger difference than what we would expect. Most importantly, it shows that 
when the level of national awareness has risen more among a specific part of the population 
(Ukrainian-speakers) than among others, there also emerges a gap between these parts of the 
population in terms of commitment to democratic values. This finding strengthens the belief in a 
link between national identity and commitment to democratic values, and it strengthens the belief 
that national identity can serve as a vehicle for spreading of democratic values also outside 
Galicia. 
 
We should also comment on the exceptionally high score that was measured on the dependent 
variable in the South region in 2018. From Figure 6.4 we can see that both ethnolinguistic groups 
are scoring high, but that it is the Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainian group that is the largest 
exception from the overall pattern. We propose that what we are seeing here is partly an effect of 
the sampling method, and possibly also a reaction by parts of the population on the annexation of 
Crimea in 2014. The reason why we come with these proposals is that a close investigation of the 
distribution of respondents in the South region shows that 27 out of the small sample of 31 
Ukrainian speaking Ukrainians from this region are drawn from Kherson oblast. Among these 27, 
there are 26 who have the maximum possible score on the index, while the one remaining 
respondent have the second highest possible score. 20 of these 27 respondents are drawn from the 
urban stratum, and thus most likely from only one or two sampling units. As we know from 
Chapter 5.2.1, respondents tend to be more and more homogenous the smaller a sampling region 
gets, and inside a single sampling unit the level of homogeneity can be very high. The extremely 
high score for Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians in the South might therefore be a result of a high 
level of commitment to democratic values among the inhabitants in one or two neighbourhoods 
in Kherson oblast. And when talking about Kherson oblast, we should have in mind that this is 







annexation of Crimea by Russia might be expected by the inhabitants of Kherson oblast as they 
due to highly undemocratic processes have lost access to their neighbouring region. We also note 
that the Russian- and mixed-speaking population in the South has a comparably high score in 
2018, which is harder to explain by reference to Kulyk. Since this is not the case in 2018 in any 
of the other regions where there are a substantial number of Russian- and mixed-speakers, and 
since the South has such exceptionally high scores only in 2018, we should also think about the 
possibility of survey errors. If not, the South region should be looked closer into in the future. 
 
The comparison of Galicia with Crimea is interesting, even though they differ highly in their 
historical developments. Crimea is the historically and culturally most Russified region in 
Ukraine, and a comparison with the “purely” Ukrainian Galicia shows a very big difference in 
level of democratic culture. This finding is supportive of Shulman’s theory of more and less 
democratic values being embedded in pro-European and pro-Russian identities respectively. The 
same pattern is visible for Donbass, which is among the regions with the lowest average scores in 
both surveys. Donbass, however, is different from Crimea both in terms of its history and in 
terms of its extremely high level of urbanization and industrialization. A comparison of Donbass 
and Galicia is not well suited for isolating specific historical variables, and our method of using 
regional dummy variables is most efficient when regions that differ on one particular variable can 
be compared with each other. The clearly defined, old borders between now-defunct states and 
empires is a rare example of a case where this method can be very efficient. However, we 
observe that Donbass, as well as Crimea, follow the pattern that we expected. 
 
7.4 Ukraine in the Eastern European context 
A case study of Ukraine will of course reveal much about Ukraine itself, but it is also relevant in 
the wider Eastern European context. We have earlier in this thesis discussed two different 
approaches to the study of historical legacies in Eastern Europe - one focusing on how pre-
communist legacies have persisted through communist rule, and another focusing on the 
homogenizing effect of communist rule. When we find that 50 years of communism could have 
the effect to erase any higher level of commitment to democratic values which might have been 
in Volhynia, we are supported by for example Badescu (2006), who concludes that 50 years of 







culture there. And when we find that national identity can survive communism and be a vehicle 
of democratic values we are supported by for example Kuzio (2001), who saw the same to be the 
case in the Baltic states, and Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya (2015), who found the same in Poland. Our 
claim to external validity will be rooted in the fact that the same borders that we have been 
focusing on in this thesis also traversed other Eastern European territories. Fuchs & Klingemann 
(2006) asked what had caused the emergence of a threshold in democratic culture somewhere in 
the eastern part of Eastern Europe, and suggested that it could be that this was caused by 1) the 
impact of additional years of communist rule in the areas that were a part of the Soviet Union 
from it establishment in 1921, it could be caused by 2) the different impact of the rule of the four 
empires that controlled much of Eastern Europe before World War 1,  it could be caused by 3) 
the impact of the traditional religion of the countries in question, and it could be caused by 4) a 
lower level of socio-economic development in the easternmost countries. Our findings support 
the second of these suggestions in combination with the third. (Regarding the fourth suggestion 
we have seen that the geographical pattern of economic development in Ukraine is opposite of 
that of Europe as a whole, since in Ukraine the easternmost regions are by far the richest. Still, 
we have found indications that socioeconomic development also plays a role in development of 
democratic political cultures.)  
 
Can our findings in any way help us understand what has happened in Ukraine the latest years? 
Eckstein (1998a) and Fuchs & Roller (1994) stressed the need for congruence between a 
country’s political culture and political system in order for the system to be stable. In a country 
where there are substantial and lasting regional differences in support for democratic values such 
a congruence can, logically speaking, not take place. The consequence of this should thus be 
instability in terms of the political system, and instability has indeed been the case in Ukraine. 
We have also seen some signs of a rising gap between Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians and other 
ethnolinguistic groups. If that finding is to be confirmed by future research, this will also be a 
hindrance for congruence between Ukraine’s political system and political culture. 
7.5 Strengths and weaknesses of the analysis 
The major strength of this analysis is that it has a higher level of geographical precision than most 







historical legacies, and we can also rule out the possibility that findings of historical legacy 
relationships are spurious and resulting from uneven distributions of demographic groups.  
 
As we have explained thoroughly in Chapter 5.2.1, we have a problem of representativeness in 
these surveys, and we do also not have the possibility of taking into account the clustering of 
respondents in sampling units when conducting our analysis. A consequence of this may be that 
standard errors are estimated as too low, and thus that the levels of significance becomes too 
high. However, the recurrence of the same findings in both the 2007 and the 2018 survey is 
strengthening our case that the conclusions we have drawn are not based on patterns that have 
occurred just due to sampling errors.  
 
A possible weakness is the questions we have based our investigation on. We have had access to 
only three questions about democratic values and based on this we are attempting to draw 
conclusions about people’s commitment to democratic values in general. Access to surveys that 
would include a higher number of questions related to democratic values, as well as questions 
pertaining directly to the link between identity, association with Western Europe or Russia and 
democratic values would have made us better equipped to make generalization about people’s 
commitment to democratic values, and also to investigate and the connections between identity 
and democratic values. However, as a survey that combines such questions with a survey 
methodology that allows for a high level of geographical precision has not been available, we 
have been confined to try to say as much as possible based on the Omnibus surveys.  
Questions about alternatives to democratic rules could also have illuminated more about people’s 
view on democracy, and this was also suggested by Fuchs & Roller (1994). We would hold, 
however, that the formulation “How important in order to live a good life” will not encourage 












8. Conclusion and suggestions for further research 
 
8.1 Conclusion 
Ever since political competition became possible by the time of the end of communism, Ukraine 
has been characterized by very strong regional divisions. It has been difficult to reach a 
consensus in society on key issues related to regime type, nation building and foreign policy 
orientation, and there has often been a strong geographical polarization on opinions on these 
issues. An aspect of these divisions has been people’s support for liberal democracy, which is a 
central factor with regards to democratization and regime stability. Ukraine’s regional divisions 
have often been attributed to historical legacies, and Peisakhin (2015, 25-26) calls Ukraine a 
“natural experiment” which is perfectly suited for investigation of how imperial legacies affect 
today’s political culture. Likewise, Pop-Eleches & Tucker (2017, 24-25) see Ukraine as a case 
which is very well suited for research on how the length of time under communist rule affects a 
population’s commitment to democratic values. This led us into formulating the following 
research question: 
 
“Can geographical patterns of democratic political culture in Ukraine be explained by the 
historical legacies of former empires and states?” 
 
Miller, White and Heywood (1998, 10) argued that it would be impossible to distinguish between 
different historical legacies in Ukraine due to the near overlapping historical borders, and we 
have shown that later authors have indeed had problems in this regard. We argue that we have 
overcome this problem by considering all the most important regime periods which may have 
made an imprint on Ukraine’s democratic culture and developed a framework for comparison of 
regions. This way we have obtained a high level of control for other variables and have thus been 
able to assess the legacies left by historical regimes. 
 
We have in this thesis found that legacies from imperial regimes in the 19th and early 20th 
century are still very visible in Ukraine in the form of a sizeable threshold in commitment to 







Empire. Ukraine’s geographical patterns of democratic culture can therefore partly be explained 
by historical legacies from these empires. A similar threshold has not been found at the former 
outer border of the Soviet Union. At the same time, we have seen that other pathways to a 
democratic political culture are open, most notably is the one which goes through socio-economic 
development. Our investigation is more precise than those found in the existing literature, and 
one contribution to the literature is strong evidence about legacy relationships between imperial 
regimes before World War 1 and present-day outcomes in terms of democratic political culture. 
 
Our focus has been on the legacies of actions made by foreign powers in the distant past. But we 
have also seen that the days when foreign powers were affecting Ukraine’s political culture may 
not be over yet. We found in several regions that a gap in commitment to democratic values has 
appeared between the Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians and members of other ethnolinguistic 
groups, and we saw that this rising gap may be linked to Russia’s involvement in the war in 
Donbass. Our surveys were not particularly well suited for further investigation of the 
ethnolinguistic aspect of Ukraine’s regional divisions, and we also could not go into detailed 
investigations of individual regions and oblasts. The southern region in particular showed a 
surprising pattern that invites for further investigation. 
 
8.2 Implications of findings 
Implications of these findings are that some of Ukraine’s problems with democratization perhaps 
can be contributed to the legacies from the Russian Empire, which are being felt in the largest 
part of the country. Some of the root causes of the political instability of Ukraine, or at least the 
current divisions, can also probably be found in the historical division between the Russian and 
Habsburg Empire, which have left legacies in terms of different levels of democratic political 
culture. In this situation it will be difficult to obtain congruence between the country’s political 
culture and its political system. We should not forget, however, that this study also confirms that 
there are other pathways to a high level of democratic culture than through regime legacies. 
 
Ukraine is not the only country which has experienced shifting regimes. A similar pattern of 
imperial rule, short-lived experiences with democracy, and Soviet or Soviet-imposed communist 







Eastern European context, and we thus add to the literature about historical legacies in Eastern 
Europe. Our findings are in line with the literature on pre-communist legacies, and also 
supportive of the connection between national identity and democratic values which has been 
found in other former communist countries 
 
8.3 Suggestions for future research 
We have in this thesis repeatedly pointed out the necessity of high quality surveys for research on 
historical legacies and regional divisions in Ukraine. The more representative a survey is on low 
geographical levels, the more precise assessments can be made about geographical differences in 
political culture, and the more precise assessments can also be made about historical legacies. If 
surveys with larger samples and better regional representativity could be provided it would also 
be possible to conduct multilevel analyses of the Ukrainian case. That would enable us to take for 
example the regional socioeconomic conditions better into account, and we could investigate how 
effects of individual-level characteristics are dependent on the context. The regional variations in 
effect of ethnolinguistic group belonging could then have been further investigated, and perhaps 
one could also make closer investigations of individual regions and oblasts.  
 
Future research should also focus more on other aspects of Ukraine’s regional political cultures, 
and the connection between national identity and political values. We have shown that 
commitment to democratic values do differ between regions, and we hold national identity as the 
most plausible vehicle for transmission of support for these values in the former Habsburg areas. 
We thus tapped into one aspect of the Ukrainian identity complexes which was relevant for our 
study. Also other values and attitudes have been found to be embedded in these identity 
complexes, most notably identification as belonging either to Europe or to the Russian sphere. 
Our thesis has been devoted to only one aspect of Ukraine’s political culture. A final 
recommendation for future research would therefore be an investigation of how historical 
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Omnibus 2007 Western subsample, Factor analysis part 1 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference                 Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      0.88541      0.70930                    0.8342       0.8342 
        Factor2  |      0.17611      0.17627                    0.1659       1.0002 
        Factor3  |     -0.00016            .             -0.0002       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N=451     




Omnibus 2007, Western subsample Factor analysis part 2, Retained factors: 1 
    --------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+----------+-------------- 
             V1 |   0.4797 |      0.7699   
             V2|   0.7153 |      0.4884   







    --------------------------------------- 
 
A3 
Omnibus 2018, Western subsample Factor analysis part 1  
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      1.77727      1.74112            0.9801       0.9801 
        Factor2  |      0.03616      0.03626            0.0199       1.0001 
        Factor3  |     -0.00011            .                -0.0001       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  =  569.41 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
A4 
Omnibus 2018 Factor analysis part 2, Retained factors: 1 
    --------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+----------+-------------- 
           V1 |   0.6996 |      0.5106   
           V2 |   0.8801 |      0.2255   
           V3 |   0.7102 |      0.4956   




Inter-item and item-index correlations for Omnibus 2007, Western subsample 
       item   |      1             2            3         index 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
         1      |   1.0000 
         2      |   0.3432   1.0000 
         3      |   0.2880   0.4296   1.0000 
   Index     |   0.7314   0.7822   0.7492   1.0000 
 
A6 
Inter-item and item-index correlations for Omnibus 2018, Western subsample 
            item |    1              2           3          index 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
                1 |   1.0000 
                2 |   0.6157   1.0000 
                3 |   0.4967   0.6251   1.0000 
         index |   0.8239   0.8828   0.8378   1.0000 
 
 
A7: Distributions of Dependent Variable,      A8: Distributions of Dependent Variable,       










A9-A12  Operationalization and distribution of control variables 
 
A9: Education 
Education: We create a trichotomous variable. Different types of secondary education make up 
the category Secondary education, no education and primary education make up the category 
Low education, and higher education make up the category higher education. (1=Secondary 
education, 2=Low education, 3=Higher education) 
 
Distribution of respondents on variable Education 




1 Secondary education 1386 1386 
2 Low education 243 112 
3 Higher education 389 544 




Urban: We keep the dichotomous variable that tells if the interview is done in an urban or rural 
stratum. (0=rural, 1=urban) 
 
Distribution of respondents on variable Urban 




0 Rural 665 693 
1 Urban 1367 1350 




Male: (0=female, 1=male) 
 
Distribution of respondents on variable Male 










0 Female 1266 1241 
1 Male 766 802 
Total 2032 2043 
 
A12: Age 
Age: We keep the original variable with six age groups. (1=18-29 years, 2=30-39 years, 3=40-49 
years, 4=50-59 years, 5=60-69 years, 6= 70 years and above). 
 
Distribution of respondents on variable Age 




1 18-29 years  371 280 
2 30-39 years 318 396 
3 40-49 years 316 308 
4 50-59 years 419 400 
5 60-69 years 335 353 
6 70 years and above 273 306 
Total 2032 2043 
 
A13-16: Residual versus fitted plots 
 
A13: Residual versus fitted plot,      A14: Residuals versus fitted plot, 
Omnibus 2007, full sample       Omnibus 2007, western subsample 
 
A15: Residual versus fitted plot,  A16: Residuals versus fitted plot, 
Omnibus 2018, full sample   Omnibus 2018, western subsample 
 







line, Omnibus 2007, full sample  line, Omnibus 2007, western subsample 
  
 
A17: Residuals versus inverse normal       A18: Residuals versus inverse normal 





Calculations done on basis of Katchanovski (2006, 214, 237)  
Katchanovski (2006, 214, 237) presents the number of years that an oblast has been under non-Russian and non-
Soviet rule between 1793 and 1944. When the former borders did not follow present-day oblast-borders, he gives the 
number of years of non-Russian and non-Soviet rule multiplied with the proportion of registered voters that today 
lives on the western side of these borders. Numbers given for Lviv and Ivano-Frankovsk are 151, as the entire area of 
these oblasts were under non-Russian and non-Soviet rule between 1793 and 1944. For Ternopil he gives the number 
134. 134/151 = 0,887. 
 
Calculations done on basis of Kulyk (2017, 9)  
Kulyk (2017, 9) presents the proportion of Russian-speakers and the proportion of the whole population who 
primarily identify as Ukrainian. On the basis of this we can calculate the numbers for non-Russian-speakers: 
2012: 
N=1920 
Number of Russian-speakers (nR)=681 
Number of non-Russian-speakers = N-nR=1239 
 
Percentage of whole population who primarily identify as Ukrainian: 53,3 % 
Percentage of Russian-speakers who primarily identify as Ukrainian: 41,4 % 










Number of Russian-speakers (nR)==811 
Number of non-Russian-speakers =N-nR=1224 
 
Percentage of whole population who primarily identify as Ukrainian: 61,4 % 
Percentage of Russian-speakers who primarily identify as Ukrainian:  41,1 % 










Regression analyses, Western subsample including control variables 















VARIABLES index index2007 index2018 index2018 index2018 
      
Region (Baseline: 
Galicia) 
     
     Volhynia (2) -0.244**  -0.348*** -0.383***  
 (0.124)  (0.0975) (0.111)  
     West Central (3) -0.334***  -0.354*** -0.388***  
 (0.0891)  (0.0971) (0.111)  
Region (Baseline: 
Volhynia) 
     
     Galicia (1)  0.263**   0.347*** 
  (0.124)   (0.0969) 
     West Central (3)  -0.0484   -0.0209 
  (0.127)   (0.106) 
Greek Catholic    -0.0756  






     
   Russian-speaking 
Ukrainian 
-0.606  -0.979** -0.981***  
 (0.581)  (0.379) (0.379)  
   Mixed-speaking 
Ukrainian 
0.485***  0.231 0.222  
 (0.130)  (0.470) (0.471)  
   Russian -0.0515  0.573** 0.593**  
 (0.196)  (0.246) (0.235)  
   Other 0.0739  0.205 0.196  







      
      
male 0.0245 0.0418 0.100 0.0995 0.105 
 (0.0841) (0.0835) (0.0834) (0.0834) (0.0822) 
age (Baseline: 18-
29) 
     
     30-39 -0.0516 -0.0622 -0.341** -0.347** -0.349** 
 (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) 
     40-49 0.176 0.153 -0.0882 -0.0894 -0.122 
 (0.120) (0.118) (0.135) (0.134) (0.133) 
     50-59 -0.00971 -0.0147 -0.214 -0.216 -0.205 
 (0.130) (0.127) (0.138) (0.137) (0.137) 
     60-69 -0.168 -0.184 0.0499 0.0467 0.0689 
 (0.151) (0.152) (0.133) (0.132) (0.131) 
     70 and above -0.202 -0.237 -0.298* -0.299* -0.267 




     
     low education -0.124 -0.129 -0.202 -0.205 -0.256 
 (0.129) (0.130) (0.179) (0.179) (0.186) 
     high education -0.182 -0.173 0.108 0.108 0.126 
 (0.160) (0.159) (0.103) (0.103) (0.102) 
urban 0.0998 0.117 0.0248 0.0291 0.0102 
 (0.0849) (0.0840) (0.0842) (0.0851) (0.0824) 
low income 0.0409 0.0797 -0.157* -0.157* -0.148* 
 (0.0908) (0.0894) (0.0877) (0.0877) (0.0874) 
Constant 0.340* 0.0737 0.392*** 0.428*** 0.0481 
 (0.182) (0.178) (0.131) (0.134) (0.141) 
      
Observations 440 440 567 567 567 
R-squared 0.066 0.048 0.105 0.106 0.094 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Regression analysis, western subsample with control variables and categorical income 
variable 
 Model 4- 





     Volhynia (2) -0.276*** 
 (0.0941) 
     West Central (3) -0.281*** 
 (0.0908) 




speaker of Ukrainian 
 













     Russian 0.619*** 
 (0.221) 




age (Baseline: 18-29)  
     30-39 -0.307*** 
 (0.109) 
     40-49 -0.0916 
 (0.109) 
     50-59 -0.199* 
 (0.110) 
     60-69 0.00531 
 (0.109) 





     low education -0.205 
 (0.155) 





(Baseline: Less than 
1001 UAH) 
 
     1001 - 2000 UAH 0.545 
 (0.383) 
     2001 - 3000 UAH 0.373 
 (0.372) 
     3001 - 4000 UAH 0.282 
 (0.386) 
     4001 - 5000 UAH 0.457 
 (0.369) 
     5001 - 6000 UAH 0.478 
 (0.383) 
     6001 - 8000 UAH 0.655* 
 (0.375) 
     8001 - 10000 UAH 1.017*** 
 (0.377) 




     DK/NA 0.333 
 (0.374) 













Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Regression analyses, full sample including control variables and interactions 
 Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
 2007- 















VARIABLES index index index index index index index index 
Region (Baseline: Galicia)         
   Volhynia (2) -0.235* -0.427***   -0.233* -0.386*** -0.236* -0.371*** 
 (0.123) (0.111)   (0.121) (0.102) (0.124) (0.103) 
   West Central (3) -0.296*** -0.409***   -0.326*** -0.376*** -0.301*** -0.401*** 
 (0.0841) (0.0974)   (0.0883) (0.0977) (0.0923) (0.100) 
   Kiev (4) -0.256*** -0.173*   -0.385*** 0.0364 -0.239* 0.140 
 (0.0899) (0.0979)   (0.105) (0.0994) (0.143) (0.119) 
   Central (5) -0.603*** -0.459***   -0.719*** -0.206** -0.992*** -0.170* 
 (0.0953) (0.0839)   (0.107) (0.0876) (0.132) (0.0994) 
   South (6) -0.185** 0.251***   -0.385*** 0.606*** 0.0559 1.108*** 
 (0.0908) (0.0919)   (0.110) (0.100) (0.157) (0.0808) 
   East Central (7) -0.130 -0.392***   -0.343*** -0.0549 0.0548 -0.163 
 (0.0812) (0.0880)   (0.107) (0.0955) (0.214) (0.125) 
   Donbass (8) -0.513*** -0.621***   -0.712*** -0.200 -0.870*** -0.848*** 
 (0.0800) (0.113)   (0.112) (0.133) (0.257) (0.289) 
   Crimea (9) -0.500***    -0.755***  -0.911***  
 (0.161)    (0.181)  (0.293)  
   Southwest (10) 0.299** -0.261**   0.238* -0.217* 0.379*** -0.303*** 
 (0.120) (0.109)   (0.126) (0.112) (0.143) (0.116) 
Non-Ukrainian speaker (Nus)       0.407 0.297 
       (0.260) (0.281) 
     Volhynia#Nus       0.344 -0.877*** 
       (0.461) (0.307) 
     West Central#Nus       -0.223 -0.269 
       (0.308) (0.414) 
     Kiev#Nus       -0.393 -0.835*** 
       (0.301) (0.312) 
     Central#Nus       0.406 -0.748** 
       (0.296) 0.299 
     South#Nus       -0.640** -1.257*** 
       (0.304) (0.293) 
     East Central#Nus       -0.557* -0.533 
       0.336 (0.308) 
     Donbas#Nus       0 0 
       (0) (0) 
     Crimea#Nus       0  
       (0)  
     Southwest#Nus       -0.701** 0.312 
       (0.336) (0.365) 
Ethno-linguistic group (Baseline: 
Ukrainian-speaker of Ukrainian 
nationality) 
        







   (0.0664) (0.0639) (0.0888) (0.0749)   
   Mixed-speaking Ukrainian   0.144* -0.263*** 0.327*** -0.421***   
   (0.0775) (0.0792) (0.0887) (0.0839)   
   Russian   -0.0494 -0.0590 0.219** -0.235*   
   (0.0808) (0.124) (0.0996) (0.138)   
   Other   0.0969 -0.129 0.319*** -0.344**   
   (0.104) (0.128) (0.122) (0.137)   
male   0.0124 0.0245 0.0334 0.00514 0.0337 -0.00404 
   (0.0502) (0.0505) (0.0489) (0.0475) (0.0484) (0.0473) 
age (Baseline: 18-29)         
     30-39   0.0291 -0.117 0.0393 -0.0891 0.0537 -0.0791 
   (0.0843) (0.0834) (0.0828) (0.0803) (0.0817) (0.0804) 
     40-49   0.0955 0.000267 0.0991 0.0143 0.109 0.0186 
   (0.0791) (0.0856) (0.0779) (0.0827) (0.0774) (0.0824) 
     50-59   -0.0263 -0.0252 -0.00294 -0.0145 -0.00555 -0.0174 
   (0.0779) (0.0832) (0.0760) (0.0810) (0.0757) (0.0804) 
     60-69   -0.0342 0.0957 -0.0342 0.106 -0.0433 0.109 
   (0.0868) (0.0846) (0.0845) (0.0830) (0.0834) (0.0822) 
     70 and above   -0.0370 -0.0519 -0.0517 -0.0164 -0.0463 -0.00260 
   (0.0998) (0.0997) (0.0974) (0.0943) (0.0957) (0.0937) 
education (Baseline: Secondary 
education) 
        
     low education   0.0906 -0.0643 0.0565 -0.128 0.0506 -0.149 
   (0.0851) (0.129) (0.0815) (0.104) (0.0808) (0.104) 
     high education   0.0507 0.0868 -0.0244 0.100* -0.0162 0.108* 
   (0.0997) (0.0561) (0.0972) (0.0555) (0.0964) (0.0557) 
urban   -0.105* -0.185*** -0.0777 -0.157*** -0.0649 -0.159*** 
   (0.0568) (0.0580) (0.0562) (0.0546) (0.0551) (0.0548) 
low income   -0.106** -0.279*** -0.0323 -0.253*** -0.0227 -0.259*** 
   (0.0527) (0.0547) (0.0522) (0.0521) (0.0522) (0.0510) 
Constant 0.290*** 0.274*** 0.0296 0.337*** 0.262** 0.453*** 0.245** 0.445*** 
 (0.0582) (0.0635) (0.109) (0.0791) (0.117) (0.0937) (0.117) (0.0946) 
         
Observations 1,863 1,961 1,836 1,960 1,836 1,960 1,836 1,960 
R-squared 0.054 0.061 0.012 0.042 0.068 0.108 0.086 0.121 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Questions about commitment to democratic values in Russian original. 
Questions as written in the questionnaire of Omnibus 2007, and as ordered by this author for Omnibus 2018. 
 
Есть разные взгляды на то, при каких социальных и политических 
условиях жизнь в стране может быть нормальной. О каждом из условий, 
которые я буду сейчас называть, скажите, пожалуйста, как Вы думаете, 
является ли оно обязательным; важным, но не обязательным; не очень 
важным; или совсем не важным, чтобы жизнь в стране могла быть 
нормальной. 
 
совсем неважно    1 
не очень важно    2 
трудно сказать    3 
важно, но не обязательно    4 
обязательно    5 








1. Право свободно говорить обо всем, даже если это увеличивает 
напряжение в обществе 
2. Возможность выпускать газеты любой политической ориентации 
3. Свобода объединения в политические партии, конкурирующие на выборах 
 
Questionnaire, Omnibus 2018: 
Codebooks are not created for the Omnibus surveys. Dataset, questionnaire and survey methodology for Omnibus 
2018 has as of 30th of May 2018 not yet been made public but will appear at the website “Kyivan Archive”: 
http://ukraine.survey-archive.com/data#user-research. 
Included in the dataset that this author has received from Kiev International Institute of Sociology are only the above 
questions about commitment to democratic values, as well as demographic background variables. Since demographic 
background questions are the same for Omnibus 2007 and 2018, we refer to the questionnaire for Omnibus 2007 for 
these (see http://ukraine.survey-archive.com/data#user-research@showResearch=113152). Since Omnibus 2018 is 
not made public yet we present these questions and answer categories here: 
 
D7 Religious Confession (religion) 
1  Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate)                                           
2  Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)                                       
3  Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church                                          
4  Greek Catholic Church          
5  Roman Catholic   
6  Protestant          
7  Muslim (Islam) 
8  Religious but do not belong to a religion, church                                                      
9  Other answer    
10 Unbeliever, atheist 
11 DK/NA   
 
D11 Average monthly net household income 
1  Less than 1001 UAH  
2  1001 - 2000 UAH      
         3  2001 - 3000 UAH     
         4  3001 - 4000 UAH      
         5  4001 - 5000 UAH      
        6  5001 - 6000 UAH.     
        7  6001 - 8000 UAH      
        8  8001 - 10000 UAH     
         9  More than 10000 UAH  
         97 DK/NA                
         99 REF    
